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Summary
Ambient awareness refers to the idea that social media users gain awareness of their online networks,
while siing through the stream of social updates spontaneously, without deliberate eort or inten-
tion. Since online networks are large and diverse, an ecient process like ambient awareness has
important implications for how people can manage to maintain and prot from them (Donath, 2007;
Resnick, 2001). Despite its growing popularity in social media research, ambient awareness had not
been studied systematically and there had been no unequivocal evidence that it can develop periph-
erally, that is, from fragmented information and in the relative absence of prior acquaintanceship
and extensive communication. e objective of this dissertation was to examine the spontaneous
inference processes implicated in ambient awareness. Two exploratory surveys revealed that users
of a microblogging site experience ambient awareness and are able to report specic knowledge of
people whose updates they follow but whom they had not met in real life. ese results strongly sug-
gested that microblogging posts are sucient for ambient awareness to develop. To test whether
ambient awareness can indeed arise spontaneously, I adapted a paradigm from psychological re-
search on spontaneous trait inferences. A series of experiments revealed that aer viewing social
media posts, people spontaneously formed accurate impressions of the actors who had ostensi-
bly wrien the posts. ese impressions included traits as well as domains of expertise, such as
programmer or photographer. Another insight was that the amount of exposure and content had
downstream consequences of people’s impressions of competence and approachability. at people
infer crucial information spontaneously while browsing social media is a premise underlying most
reasoning surrounding ambient awareness. ese studies are the rst to directly test it. Via social
media, people receive a steady stream of updates and notications from their extended networks,
but this information is fragmented and too much to carefully processes and remember. e results
of my dissertation suggest that even in such conditions, people are able extract information, which
allows to make sense of who is who and who knows what in their vast online networks.

Zusammenfassung
Der Begri ambient awareness umfasst die Idee, dass Nutzer sozialer Medien Kenntnis u¨ber ihre
Online-Netzwerke erlangen wa¨hrend sie, ohne vorsa¨tzliche Anstrengung oder Absicht, den Strom
sozialer Updates durchka¨mmen. Da online Netzwerke groß und divers sind, kann ein ezienter
Prozess wie Ambient Awareness wichtige Auswirkungen darauf haben, wie Menschen ihre Netzw-
erke organisieren und von ihnen protieren ko¨nnen (Donath, 2007; Resnick, 2001).
Trotz der wachsenden Popularita¨t des Forschungsfeldes “Soziale Medien”, wurde Ambient Aware-
ness bislang noch nicht systematisch erforscht, so gab es keine eindeutige Denition und auch keine
Hinweise darauf, dass Ambient Awareness peripheral, das heißt auf Grundlage fragmentierter In-
formationen und in weitgehender Abwesenheit von vorher-bestehender Bekanntscha und um-
fassender Kommunikation zwischen Personen, entstehen kann. Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es,
spontane Inferenzprozesse, welche Ambient Awareness implizieren, zu untersuchen.
Zwei explorative Studien zeigten, dass Nutzer von Microblogging-Seiten Ambient Awareness er-
leben und, dass sie in der Lage sind spezisches Wissen bezu¨glich derjenigen Menschen dessen Up-
dates sie folgen wiederzugeben – ohne diese Personen zuvor im echten Leben getroen zu haben.
Diese Ergebnisse legen Nahe, dass Microblogging-Beitra¨ge ausreichend sind, damit Ambient Aware-
ness entsteht. Um zu testen, ob sich Ambient Awareness in der Tat spontan entwickeln kann,
habe ich das Paradigma der sogenannten ‘spontaneous trait inferences’ aus der psychologischen
Forschung an Ambient Awareness angepasst. Eine Serie von Experimenten zeigte, dass Personen
nach dem Lesen von Beitra¨gen aus sozialen Medien spontan akkurate Eindru¨cke von den vorge-
blichen Verfassern geformt haen. Diese Eindru¨cke enthielten Charaktereigenschaen, aber auch
Expertenwissen, zum Beispiel Kenntnis ber den Beruf: Programmierer (Programmieren) oder Fo-
tograf (Fotograe). Eine weitere Erkenntnis war, dass die Ha¨ugkeit und der Inhalt von Beitra¨gen
Konsequenzen auf die gewonnenen Eindru¨cke hinsichtlich Kompetenz und Zuga¨nglichkeit haen.
Dass Menschen spontan wichtige Informationen ableiten wa¨hrend sie durch soziale Netzwerke
browsen, ist eine Pra¨misse, die in der Ambient Awareness Diskussion o vorausgesetzt wird – diese
Studien sind die ersten, die diese Annahme direkt testen.
Durch soziale Medien erhaltenMenschen einen stetigen Fluss von Updates und Benachrichtigungen
aus ihrem erweiterten sozialen Netzwerk. Diese Informationen sind jedoch zu fragmentiert und zu
zahlreich um aufmerksam und bewusst wahrgenommen und langfristig behalten zu werden. Wie
die Ergebnisse meiner Dissertation zeigen, sindMenschen dennoch in der Lage, sich aus der Vielzahl
von Informationen und Informationsbruchstcken diejenigen herauszultern, die Ihnen dabei helfen
sich in ihren weitlugen Online-Netzwerken zurechtzunden und zu wissen wer was macht, und
wer was weiß.
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1. Introduction
Every person needs information. For a knowledge worker this could be help solving a task, for a job
seeker it could be nding out about an interesting oer, and for just about anyone it could be geing
a good vacation tip or a book recommendation. In research, these are called informational benets
and can be formally dened as “timely access to novel, valuable information” (Burt, 1992, as cited
in Utz, 2015). Social connections are an invaluable source of informational support, which is why
scholars refer to them social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Social media make it easy to connect with
people at virtually no cost and eort (Tong & Walther, 2011). Perhaps not surprisingly, there have
been great expectations with regard to social media’s potential social and informational benets
(Donath, 2007; Resnick, 2001).
Two ways in which social media have been proposed to enhance information exchange are by help-
ing seekers identify sources of information and by improving the relationship between the infor-
mation seekers and sources (Fulk & Yuan, 2013). Social media can be used to gain such information
deliberately. For example, a researcher who plans to approach a potential collaborator might choose
to look at this person’s social media activity to nd out if they seem approachable and to get a sense
of who they are. With regard to who knows what, a symposium organizer who wants to hire a
speaker with certain expertise, can query LinkedIn and review the proles of potential candidates.
In each of these cases, social media further facilitate communication by providing easy, inexpensive
ways to contact people. Although relevant, these active processes are not the focus of my disser-
tation. Instead, I consider whether people gain such awareness while only siing through their
newsfeeds and notications and whether this happens spontaneously, without deliberate eort or
intention. is idea is referred to as ambient awareness and can be best dened as “awareness of so-
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7cial others, arising from the frequent reception of fragmented personal information, such as status
updates and various digital footprints, while browsing social media.” In the examples above, ambi-
ent awareness would be the equivalent of the researcher bumping into a potential collaborator and
happening to know that this potential collaborator is a friendly, sociable person who enjoys skiing,
which presents an easy way to strike up a conversation. e symposium organizer realizes that they
happen to know of several people who t the desired prole. Such a process carries important im-
plications. Social media users already spend a substantial amount of time browsing their newsfeeds
(Vorderer et al., 2016), whereas the deliberate, active query of available repositories is hindered by
various cognitive and motivational factors (Hinds & Pfeer, 2003). Besides, the copious amount of
content available online makes it dicult to nd relevant information on demand even if motivation
were present.
Overall, the answer of the question of whether social media contribute to informational processes
has been ‘yes’ (Chui et al., 2012; Leonardi et al., 2013). Recently the association between social me-
dia use and informational benets has been demonstrated in a sample representative of the Dutch
population (Utz & Breuer, 2016). But what underlies this association is unclear. By denition, hav-
ing more contact increases the amount of potentially accessible information (Granoveer, 1973).
However, the mere availability of information is not the same as being able to access it. Informa-
tion exchange is a complex, multi-faceted process, which involves locating sources of information,
approaching them, and receiving helpful answers (Austin, 2003; Fulk & Yuan, 2013; Levin & Cross,
2004). To understand the benets of social media use, one would need to look at the challenges and
problems of information exchange and how social media help resolve them.
Ambient awareness plays a central role in theories regarding the benets of social media use (Hamp-
ton et al., 2011; Leonardi, 2015; Rice et al., 2017; Utz, 2016), but the empirical evidence for its existence
is limited. Furthermore, the central premise that it develops peripherally, not through deliberately
aending to information, but rather as an artifact of browsing, has not been tested. e present
research examines ambient awareness and the processes that underlie it.
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1.1 Ambient Awareness
Originally, ambient awareness has been used to describe the sense of familiarity stemming from
physical co-presence. Without ever talking to the coworker across the hall, over time we end up
knowing quite a bit about her simply by catching a glimpse of an ‘Open Science’ t-shirt, hearing a
Radiohead song behind her closed door, and seeing her leave the oce to make a cappuccino ve
times a day. e resulting awareness can come in handy if we are to strike up a conversation or
need advice for the best coee joints in the city. Informal communication serves a similar purpose
(Kraut et al., 2002). To phrase this in a less anecdotal manner, people are a valuable resource of
social and informational support (Adler & Kwon, 2002) and some level of awareness is important
for building and maintaining relationships (Fulk & Yuan, 2013; Resnick, 2001). With computer-
mediated communication and especially social media, physical co-presence is no longer required
and informal communication is less common. is has naturally raised concerns of how to enable
these vital aspects of social interaction. Early work has focused on enhancing ambient awareness
through emulating co-presence (e.g., Liechti & Ichikawa, 2000). Essentially, the idea of ambient
awareness via social media can develop despite being devoid of classic audiovisual cues, due to the
incessant stream of social information. Typically brief and momentary, single pieces of information
are not particularly informative and rarely devoted more than a passing glance, but over time the
accumulation of fragmented personal information brings about awareness (Kaplan, 2012; Leonardi,
2015; ompson, 2008; Utz, 2016).
e idea that awareness can develop on the basis of minimal content such as status updates, is con-
ceptually supported by research in computer-mediated communication and psychology. According
to the social information processing theory and the hyperpersonal model (Walther, 1996, 2007),
people use whatever cues are available to them to form impressions. Psychological research on
spontaneous inferences from brief instances of behavior has consistently demonstrated that people
spontaneously extract potentially valuable information, even in conditions of supercial processing
and under high cognitive or information load (Uleman et al., 2008). Research has found this to be the
case for various types of information, including traits, values, and, more recently, social roles (Chen
1.1. Ambient Awareness 9
et al., 2014). Although conceptually related, most existing research on spontaneous trait inferences
diers from social media in important ways that prevent direct generalization. Social-media posts
are composed by the person to whom they refer. Such self-generated descriptions might be less
diagnostic and reliable than other-generated cues (Utz, 2010). Furthermore, rather than seen one at
a time, status updates are oen received in aggregate with updates from a number of people pre-
sented together in somewhat chronological order (e.g., Facebook’s Newsfeed; Twier’s Timeline),
which is likely to inuence how they are processed. In research on online impression formation,
it is common to explicitly ask participants to judge others, whose proles they view at their own
pace, whereas browsing involves skimming through information without any particular intention.
Even if the encountered posts contain relevant cues, it is not clear whether these cues will lead to
inferences when people encounter them briey and without explicit impression formation goals.
1.1.1 Awareness of who is who
Familiarity and liking play a crucial role in interpersonal processes and knowledge exchange is no
exception (Andrews & Delahaye, 2000). People are likely to seek information from others who ap-
pear approachable and easy to reach out to (Auster &Wei Choo, 1994; Lu & Yuan, 2011). Familiarity
between interaction partners can lead to establishing a common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991)
or provide a topic for starting a conversation, or inform strategic self-presentation (Hancock et al.,
2008). Since asking for help or advice tends to involve disclosing sensitive information (gaps in
knowledge at the very least), some degree of trust in the information source is required (Levin &
Cross, 2004).
Several case and intervention studies on the use of awareness-enhancing technologies have found
positive outcomes in terms of feelings of connectedness, intimacy, and well-being (Cornejo et al.,
2013; Ito, 2005; Romero et al., 2007). In qualitative studies on social media use in organizations, peo-
ple describe ambient awareness as a result of using microblogging sites. Awareness was perceived as
having positive impact on information sharing, common ground in meetings, and contextual social
presence (Zhao et al., 2011); connecting with colleagues and especially with distant colleagues (Dim-
icco et al., 2008); and receiving help, gaining access to breaking news, picking up trends, and feeling
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connected (Ehrlich & Shami, 2010). In these studies, ambient awareness has been described in detail
and illustrated with compelling anecdotal examples, but these sources provide no quantitative data
to support and clarify the suggested process. More recent work done within organizations showed
that using social media indeed facilitates knowledge exchange (Leonardi, 2015). When complex
knowledge from social others was needed, knowledge transfer was more successful and satisfy-
ing if people delayed asking and used social networking sites to gain awareness for the knowledge
sources, prior to approaching them. Awareness in this study was inferred from specic network-
ing activities (e.g., browsing proles), which their participants reported to have performed. Surveys
have found a positive eect of social media use on network diversity and access to social capital,
both directly through online activities and indirectly through promoting participation in traditional,
oine seings (Hampton et al., 2011). e authors aribute the eect to awareness, because it en-
ables visibility and ow of information between dierent people and groups, thereby bridging the
boundaries between them and likely increasing social capital. Awareness itself was not assessed.
e few quantitative studies which address ambient awareness, oer no denitive operationalization
and measurement. Instead, some authors speculate its presence (Hampton et al., 2011) or equate
it with social media use (Leonardi, 2015). While these practices can be suited for answering the
research questions addressed in each respective paper, they fail to oer a comprehensive account of
ambient awareness and leave a number of open questions related to its content and prevalence.
1.1.2 Awareness of who knows what
Being able to recognize the expertise of others is one of the core components of transactive memory
(Lewis &Herndon, 2011;Wegner, 1987) – a prominent theory of group cognition, according to which
groups develop awareness of who knows what (expertise awareness) and this allows them to coor-
dinate tasks and information. e resulting performance benets have been widely-documented:
Research on teams and organizations has consistently demonstrated that expertise recognition and
the subsequent awareness of who knows what enhance knowledge processes (Austin, 2003; Lewis,
2004, but see also: Ray et al., 2012). Similarly, in personal and professional social networks, aware-
ness of who knowswhat can help people locate potential sources of information, thus helping people
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gain timely access to valuable information.
Awareness of who knows what is known to be higher among well-acquainted individuals (Holling-
shead, 1998; Wegner et al., 1991) and to develop in the course of communication (Lewis, 2004). Less
is known about its antecedents among strangers. Gaining information from close others is not op-
timal. Structurally, the prevalence of novel information is more likely to be higher among weak ties
(Granoveer, 1973). e role of digital technologies has been examined primarily with regard to
providing people with information regarding others’ expertise via knowledge management systems
(Alavi & Leidner, 2001). However, knowledge repositories are not used in optimal, eective ways
(Hinds & Pfeer, 2003). More recently, researchers have considered how the light-weight commu-
nication on social media and networking sites might facilitate expertise awareness (Fulk & Yuan,
2013; Leonardi & Meyer, 2015).
Transactive memory has been researched mainly in the context of organisational knowledge ex-
change, but might in fact play an important role in how individuals can benet from their personal
networks. Digital technologies enable its users to build large networks and connect with people
who can potentially provide useful information, but without knowing whom to approach, gaining
access to this information can be dicult. Making public requests, for example, could involve self-
disclosure, which might be undesirable or even risky (Vitak & Ellison, 2012). Being aware of who
knows what could help locate potential sources of information to approach directly, thus avoiding
public requests.
Evidence for ambient awareness and its potential role in information exchange comes from a num-
ber of recent studies. Leonardi (2015) found that aer using social media, employees had beer
awareness of who knows what in their department. e participants reported both the frequency
with which they ”happened to notice” versus ”spent time carefully reading” information about oth-
ers and it was the former that beer predicted the subsequent awareness. Another study found that
people were more satised with knowledge transfer, if they used social media to nd out more about
their communication partners before actually approaching them (Leonardi & Meyer, 2015).
ese studies highlight the importance of ambient awareness but fail to provide a convincing test of
themajor premise that awareness arises without deliberate eort or intention. Surveysmeasure user
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activity and correlate it to perceived levels of awareness. However, they are not able to validate the
accuracy of people’s perceptions. Studies done within organizations could validate the accuracy of
awareness, but could not rule out the inuence of prior acquaintanceship, face-to-face interactions,
and motivation, since they were conducted in a workplace context where people interact frequently
and topics related to expertise are particularly salient.
1.2 Objectives
Despite its growing popularity in social media research, ambient awareness had not been studied
systematically and there had been no clear denition or evidence that it can develop peripherally,
that is, from fragmented information and in the relative absence of prior acquaintanceship and ex-
tensive communication. Based on the literature on social information processing (Walther, 1992)
and spontaneous trait inferences (Uleman et al., 2008), it can be expected that people will form im-
pressions of social others even fromminimal cues and exposure. However, to date, there had been no
data on the extent and type of information users infer solely on the basis of browsing social media.
e rst objective of my dissertation is to establish an operational denition of ambient awareness,
grounding it in relevant notions from psychology and computer-mediated communication and to
provide empirical data on primary questions related to its prevalence and content.
Aspects of the denition of ambient awareness imply that the process is automatic (i.e., it is cogni-
tively ecient and occurring spontaneously). e question of automaticity is crucial, considering
the large amount of information on social media and networking sites. Processing this informa-
tion without particular eort and deliberation can be key to deriving benets from online social
networks. ere is consistent evidence that trait inferences are made spontaneously on the basis of
minimal cues, such as short behavioral descriptions or brief exposure to faces and non-verbal behav-
ior (Uleman et al., 2008). However, as discussed earlier, the extent to which spontaneous trait infer-
ences are made on social media is not clear because (a) microblogging updates are self-generated; (b)
multiple updates are viewed simultaneously; (c) updates are not processed aentively but are viewed
in ‘browse mode’. erefore, the second objective of my dissertation is to test whether people make
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spontaneous inferences when browsing social media.
Lastly, crucial to information exchange is awareness of who knows what. Inferences of expertise
are dierent from trait inferences. e explanation behind spontaneous inferences in psychology
revolve around the idea that some information is inherently and fundamentally valuable (Moskowitz
& Olcaysoy Okten, 2016; Uleman et al., 2008). For example, knowing others’ traits and goals helps
people judge whether they would aack or protect them, which is likely not the case when it comes
to knowing whether someone is a programmer or a photographer. My third objective is to test
whether inferences of domain expertise occur spontaneously.
2. Exploring ambient awareness
In a set of exploratory surveys, I sought to establish an operational denition of ambient aware-
ness and gather evidence regarding its occurrence among social media users. To examine whether
awareness of online contacts can develop peripherally from browsing social media, the surveys were
conducted among users of the microblogging site Twier. Individual posts on Twier are limited to
140 characters and posts are typically public. Communication on the site takes place via brief posts
and ambient awareness can be studied in the relative absence of more extensive forms of commu-
nication.
2.1 Method overview
Data about each participants’ own Twier network were retrieved automatically via Twier’s API.
Participant saw a list of 100 randomly selected people whose updates they followed on Twier and
were asked to classify as many as possible and at least 50 into (a) people they encounter primarily
on Twier (Twier-only contacts); (b) people they encounter outside of Twier; (c) non-human,
that is, corporate accounts, brands, promoter, spam, or other automated services; (d) unknown, in
case they could not at all recognize the account. is Twier Network Survey procedure allowed for
assessing participants’ awareness towards people they knew only through Twier. For a random
selection of Twier-only contacts, participants answered a number of questions starting with famil-
iarity (“Are you at all familiar with this person?”) and probing further into what they knew about
the user (checklist of common person-information categories, such as hobbies and interests, major
life events), expertise awareness (checklist of common recreation activities and professional sectors),
14
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passive communication (frequency of seeing posts) and active communication (direct messages and
reacting to content), relationship duration, and perceived competence and approachability.
e surveys also featured a single-item assessment of participants’ experience of ambient awareness
based on the following denition: ”It is possible that when using Twier, you develop awareness of
the people whose updates you follow. Even if individual updates are short and mundane, together
they might give you an idea of the person who posts them - what they are like, what they do, etc. Do
you experience such general awareness of the people in your Twier network and to what extent?”
It was rated on a continuous scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (to a great extent).
e surveys were conducted online with a convenience sample of US citizens from the online panel
Tellwut (tellwut.com). Study 1 had a sample of 213 participants (56% women). e average network
size was 427 (SD = 608; Mdn = 135) and the average duration of Twier use was 3.5 years (SD = 2).
Study 2 had 148 participants (68% female), mean network of 519 (SD = 634; Mdn = 217) with 4 years
(SD = 2) average duration of Twier use.
2.2 Main Results
emajority of participants reported moderately high levels of awareness for people in their Twier
network (Study 1: M = 5.65, SD = 2.09; Study 2: M = 6.32, SD = 2.25), indicating that experiencing
ambient awareness was not uncommon in a diverse sample of Twier users. Awareness was not
only a general experience. When participants saw the proles of people they follow on Twier,
they reported being familiar with a substantial proportion of these proles.
Roughly half of the presented proles were recognized (46% in Study 1; and 63% likelihood in rec-
ognizing a prole in Study 2), which is substantial, considering the large average network size in
the studies. For each person identied as at least somewhat familiar, participants answered whether
they knew the person outside of Twier. A large number of people were only known through Twit-
ter (75% in Study 1 and 73% in Study 2). Furthermore, passive communication, that is, frequency
of encountering a persons’ posts, was the best predictor of individual-level awareness (B = 0.36, SE
= 0.06, p < .01), even while controlling for relationship duration (B = 0.07, SE = 0.05, p > .05), and
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of information categories in Study 1 (le) and 2 (right). Checklist measure.
Reproduced from Appendix A Figures 1 and 2.
active communication (B = 0.21, SE = 0.09, p < .05). Together, these ndings suggest that ambient
awareness can develop from reading microblogging content.
Awareness was not merely a general, undierentiated experience. Instead, participants were able
to report the kind of information they had encountered about individual members of their network.
e most commonly reported categories were information about the target’s personality, career,
humor, and hobbies. Individual frequencies can be seen in (Figure 2.1). e number of reported
knowledge categories was positively associated with ambient awareness (r = .59, p < .001).
2.3 Discussion
e two surveys revealed that social media users experience ambient awareness. e users’ sub-
jective experiences were complemented by their ability to recognize and report specic knowledge
of people they follow on Twier, but had not met in real life. ese results strongly suggested that
microblogging posts are sucient for ambient awareness to develop. Hence, the rst project of my
dissertation served to highlight the likely existence of the phenomenon of ambient awareness and
justify its further investigation.
3. Spontaneous inferences online
e second aim of my dissertation was to investigate whether spontaneous trait inferences occur
under conditions characteristic of social media and networking sites: non-extreme, ostensibly self-
generated content (Experiment 1), simultaneous presentation of multiple cues (Experiment 2), and
self-paced browsing (Experiment 3). I adapted an established social-cognitive paradigm, which as-
sessed inferences indirectly via a probe recognition task, while ruling out the eects of memory and
intentionality. is project included two additional experiments (1A and 2A), which were concep-
tually similar of Experiments 1 and 2 and yielded very similar results. To avoid redundancy and
comply with a strict word limit, I wrote a paper based on the three main experiments and reported
the remaining ones in a supplementary report (Appendix C).
3.1 Method overview
All experiments were based on an adapted version of the false recognition paradigm (Todorov &
Uleman, 2002), where inferences are assessed via a probe recognition task. First, participants saw a
number of social media posts, consisting of sentences and realistic pictures of actors who ostensibly
posted them. Some of the sentences implied traits (e.g., “Just spilled coee all over my laptop”
implying clumsy). Participants were asked to read the posts without any mention of impression
formation (learning phase). In Experiment 1, status updates were presented one at a time for 5
seconds. In Experiment 2 there were 9 updates per trial. In Experiment 3, all updates were presented
on a timeline, which participants could browse at their own pace, while instructed to select the
updates they nd interesting.
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In a subsequent recognition task, the same actors were paired with single words, and for each pair
participants indicated whether the word appeared in the actor’s description. It has been shown that
if the target word is the trait implied by the actor’s description, participants make more mistakes
saying that it was in the description (Todorov & Uleman, 2002). is false recognition of implied
traits occurs because, while reading the descriptions, participants spontaneously infer the implied
traits and associate them with the corresponding authors. Hence, false recognition rates serve as
a dependent variable and a paern where more recognitions are made on same-trait trials is inter-
preted as support for spontaneous trait inferences.
In addition to the established false recognition measure, I introduced alternative assessments of
impression formation, which involved choosing traits to describe an actor (Experiments 1 and 2)
and choosing between two actors for a scenario that calls for the trait implied for one of the actors
(Experiment 3).
e experiments were conducted in a lab, with a convenience sample of undergraduate students re-
cruited from the participant pool of a German research institute. For ve within-subject experiments
the sample was 169 participants.
3.2 Main Results
e primary dependent variable - false recognition rates - was analyzed with paired-sample t-tests.
In all of the experiments, I tested whether participants made more mistakes for same-trait trials as
compared to control trials.
irty participants took part in Experiment 1 (22 female). Participants made more mistakes when
an actor’s face was paired with the trait implied by this actor’s post (implied-trait condition; M =
0.55, SD = 0.24), as compared to a trait implied for another actor (other-trait condition; M = 0.34,
SD = 0.22, p < .001, Hedges’ g [95% CI] = 0.89 [0.41, 1.4]) or a novel trait (control condition; M =
0.23, SD = 0.17, p < .001, Hedges’ g [95% CI] = 1.47 [0.89, 2.13]). is paern suggests that people
spontaneously inferred traits when reading status updates with mild content, wrien from a rst-
person perspective.
3.2. Main Results 19
Results from the impression formation measures were analyzed with exact binomial tests. e re-
sults from the impression formations measure were analogous: When asked to evaluate the actors
from the learning task, participants selected the implied trait over another trait of the same valence
62% of the time. An exact binomial sign test indicated that this was signicantly higher than chance
(95%CI [0.55,0.69], p = 0.001).
Nineteen participants took part (16 female) in Experiment 2. Multiple actors were presented simul-
taneously, which is why the experiment featured dierent control conditions. Same-trait trials were
compared to trials where an actor was presented with the trait of another actor who had originally
appeared in the same trial (other trait, same trial) or in a dierent trial (other trait, other trial). Par-
ticipants made considerably more mistakes when an actor’s face was paired with the trait implied
for this actor (implied-trait condition;M = 0.57, SD = 0.23), as compared to a trait implied for another
actor in the same trial (M = 0.3, SD = 0.15, p < .001, Hedges’ g [95% CI] = 1.32 [0.75, 2]) or another
trial (M = 0.29, SD = 0.18, p < .001, Hedges’ g [95% CI] = 1.3 [0.67, 2.03]). ere was no signicant
dierence between the two control conditions. Crucial in this experiment is the dierence in false
recognitions between traits, implied by status updates that were presented during the same trial.
Although the updates appeared simultaneously, the trait implied by each update was exclusively
associated with the person who posted the update.
Again, the paern emerging form the alternative assessmentwas consistent. When asked to evaluate
an actor, participants chose the implied trait over another trait of the same valence 75% of the time,
which was signicantly higher than chance (95%CI [0.66,0.82], p < .0001). ese results provide
evidence that participants made actor-specic trait inferences.
Experiment 3 had all status updates presented on a single timeline, which participants browsed at
their own pace. ere were forty-ve participants (37 female). Here the control conditions were
the same as in Experiment 1: the trait of another actor or another trait. e paern of means was
consistent with previous ndings: higher number of error rates in the implied-trait condition (M =
0.43, SD = 0.25), as compared to other-trait (M = 0.37, SD = 0.21, p = .058, Hedges’ g [95% CI] = 0.28
[0.01, 0.57]) and control (M = 0.24, SD = 0.19, p <.001, Hedges’ g [95% CI] = 0.86 [0.5, 1.24]). e
dierence between implied and other-traits was small and only approaching signicance. Given
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that the means were in line with the hypothesis and a one-sided test (justied by the preregistered
directional prediction) would have been signicant, my conclusion is that spontaneous inferences
did occur.
is experiment featured a scenario-based assessment of impressions where participants had to
choose between two actors for a scenario that calls for the trait implied for one of the actors. Across
four dierent scenarios, participants selected the actorwhose status update implied a trait thatwould
be desirable in the particular scenario 61% of the times, which was signicantly higher than chance
(95%CI [0.54,0.68], p = 0.002), which oered support for the occurrence of trait inferences.
roughout all experiments, I assessed participants memory for the stimulus materials and estab-
lished that their recall was low. Responses were mostly absent (40% - 47%) or highly inaccurate (28%
to 41%). Occasionally, participants recalled the sentence of a dierent actor from the dataset (16% -
18%). More details can be found in Appendix B.
3.3 Discussion
e experiments showed that trait inferences occur from non-extreme self-generated content, which
is commonly found in social-media updates (Experiment 1) and when 9 status updates from dierent
people were presented in parallel (Experiment 2). Although inferences did occur when participants
browsed freely, the results cast doubt on whether participants successfully associated the traits with
the corresponding status update authors (Experiment 3). Visual summary of the results can be seen
in Figure 3.1.
A major strength of this project was bringing together research on snap social judgment and online
impression formation. Prior research has shown that person-inferences are unintentional, cogni-
tively ecient, long-lasting, and can be of traits, but also values, goals, or intentions (Uleman et al.,
2008). at similar process takes place on social media where information is oen merely glanced at,
is the main line of reasoning behind of ambient awareness (Leonardi, 2015; Leonardi & Meyer, 2015;
ompson, 2008; Utz, 2016), but this project is the rst to directly address and demonstrate it. e
project was a crucial step towards examining the impact of spontaneous impression formation on
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Figure 3.1: Visual summary of results from the false recognition paradigm. Higher number of false
recognition rates in the implied-trait condition (relative to the other two conditions) indicate occur-
rence of spontaneous inferences. Center lines show the medians; box limits indicate rst and third
quartiles; whiskers extend to the highest and lowest value within 1.5 times the interquartile range;
outliers are represented by dots. Reproduced from Appendix B Figure 2.
relational and informational processes online. One limitation of the project were the inconclusive
results with regard to self-paced browsing. Although present, evidence for spontaneous inferences
during browsingwasweaker and I sought to validate it further in the subsequent studies I conducted.
4. Spontaneous inferences of expertise
e purpose of this project was to examine whether awareness of domain expertise (who knows
what) can develop spontaneously and eciently in the course of browsing. Although there is evi-
dence that spontaneous inferences are made for various kinds of information, including traits, goals,
and values, the explanations behind spontaneous inferences revolve around the idea that some in-
formation is inherently and fundamentally valuable (Moskowitz & Olcaysoy Okten, 2016; Uleman
et al., 2008). For example, knowing others’ traits and goals helps people judge whether they would
aack or protect them, which is likely not the case when it comes to knowing whether someone is
a programmer or a photographer. I therefore pursued this question in a set of online experiments.
4.1 Method overview
e experiments in this project were also based on the false recognition paradigm. Participants (ob-
servers) browsed social media posts, some of which contained cues to the expertise of the people
who ostensibly posted them (actors). Instead of implying traits, some posts contained domain cues
(e.g., “Front-end developer aka JavaScript wizard also HTML5/CSS3. Hire me!” suggesting knowl-
edge in programming). e focus of the rst experiment was on whether people infer domains (as
opposed to traits). Participants were asked to read the posts and saw either one post per trial or
browsed all posts on a timeline. us, this experiment included a presentation condition where I
had previously found strong evidence for spontaneous trait inferences (single posts) and a condition
in which the results with regard to traits were inconclusive (timeline). In the second experiment, all
participants saw the posts on a timeline and were only instructed to browse though the posts, rather
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than read them. e purpose was to test whether domain inferences persist when aentiveness is
diminished. Two additional factors were introduced: half of the actors appeared had only one do-
main cue and the other half had four domain cues (number of domain cues; within-subjects); some
participants received instructions which increased the salience of domain knowledge by implying
an upcoming expert selection task (implied goal; between-subjects).
To avoid potential confounds related to participants’ stereotypes of certain domains, I used an algo-
rithm to generate a novel set of stimuli on each run. In this way, each participant saw a particular
domain with a dierent combination of face, name, and sentence. ere was no mention of expertise
inference or impression formation in the instructions, therefore the inferences observers made can
be considered spontaneous. e experiments were browser-based and closely resembled an actual
social media site.
e false recognitions measure was similar to the one used in the Spontaneous Trait Inferences
project, with the only dierence that probe type was manipulated within and not between actors.
at is, each actor from the learning phase appeared twice in the probe recognition task: once with
the domain implied by their learning-phase post and once with the domain implied for another
actor. In this study, I also measured domain inferences directly, by asking participants to identify
the domain of each actor from a list of 9 domains and an option to skip the question. Experiment 2
included an additional measure of impressions, where participants saw pairs of actors from dierent
within-subject conditions (single domain cue; multiple domain cues; single neutral cue; multiple
neutral cues) and were asked to select the more approachable or the more competent.
e experiments were conducted online with a convenience sample recruited through the partici-
pant pool Prolic (hp://prolic.ac). Most participants were employed full-time (ca. 50%), part-time
or unemployed and seeking a job (ca. 30%). e nal sample consisted of 91 participants in Experi-
ment 1 and 269 participants in Experiment 2.
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4.2 Main Results
e false recognitions measure was analyzed using linear mixed models t by maximum likeli-
hood (Bates et al., 2015). For the domain identication measure, observed accuracy was compared
to chance-level accuracy (guessing) using binomial tests. Generally, the two measures of domain
inferences revealed analogous results.
In Experiment 1, there was the predicted main eect of probe type on false recognition rates and no
eect of presentation. First, to determine the eect of probe type (same versus other), we compared
an intercept only model (M1) with a model including probe type (M2) and a model with interaction
between probe type and presentation (M3). Participants made more mistakes on same-domain (M
= 0.52, SD = 0.22) versus other-domain trials (M = 0.39, SD = 0.23; Hedges’ g = 0.4 95%CI [0.11,0.7],
p < .0001), regardless of presentation. With regard to domain identication, in both conditions,
participants’ responses were signicantly higher than chance at recognizing the domains implied
by actors’ posts (single post condition: 30% of successful recognition, 95%CI [0.25,0.34], p < .0001;
timeline condition: 33% of successful recognition, 95%CI [0.28,0.38], p < .0001). ere was no sig-
nicant dierence in domain identication accuracy between the two presentation conditions, t(78)
= -0.703, p = 0.48.
According to the results of Experiment 2, when instructed to browse through a timeline of social me-
dia posts, participants spontaneously inferred actors’ domains of interest/expertise from their posts,
but only for actors who had multiple expertise-implying posts. For actors with multiple-domain
cues, participants made more mistakes on trials where actors were presented with the domain im-
plied by their posts (same;M = 0.65, SD = 0.29), as compared to trials on which actor were presented
with other domains (other;M = 0.42, SD = 0.28; Hedges’ g = 0.52 [0.35,0.69]). For actors with single-
domain cues, participants made similar number of mistakes regardless of probe (same: M = 0.47, SD
= 0.28; other: M = 0.43, SD = 0.27; Hedges’ g = 0.11 [-0.06,0.28]).
e analyses of domain identication revealed a similar paern: Participants were slightly, but sig-
nicantly, beer than chance at recognizing the domains of actors with a single cue (24% of success-
ful identication, 95%CI [0.21,0.27], p < .0001) and substantially beer for actors with multiple cues
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(40% of successful identication (95%CI [0.37,0.43]), p < .0001). us trait inferences only occurred
for actors who had multiple domain cues.
ere was no eect of expertise salience (expertise-related goal implied by the mention of an up-
coming task), but due to a failed manipulation check, it was not possible to determine whether the
lack of eect was due to the irrelevance of expertise salience or to an unsuccessful manipulation.
Another nding was that the inferences participants made also colored their impressions of the
actors (Figure 4.1): Actors with domain-implying posts were more likely to be judged as competent.
Actors seen more frequently were generally judged as more approachable.
Figure 4.1: Probability of selecting an actor as more (a) approachable or (b) competent as a function
of cue type (domain vs. neutral) and number (one vs. four cues). Reproduced from Appendix D
Figure 4.
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4.3 Discussion
e ndings suggest that people spontaneously extract information about domains of expertise.
Brief glances at posts such as “Front-end developer aka JavaScript wizard, hire me!” were sucient
for participants to infer the implied domain (‘programming’) and associate it with the person who
posted the update. When participants were merely instructed to browse through a timeline of social
media posts, they spontaneously inferred actors’ domains of expertise implied by the actors’ posts,
but only for actors who had multiple expertise-implying posts. One interpretation of this paern
is that multiple posts resulted in stronger inferences, that is, that inferences from multiple cues
were stronger than inferences from single cues. Alternatively, it is possible that participants simply
skipped some of the posts. In this case, if an actors’ expertise can be inferred from multiple cues,
the likelihood that a participant stumbled upon at least one of them was greater than if there was
only one cue. Regardless of the underlying mechanism, our results show that people inferred the
expertise of others while browsing.
Programming the experiments in a way that allowed for random pairing of stimuli on each run
(e.g., for each participant having a dierent actor face and name assigned to being a ‘programmer’),
was an important methodological innovation. Extraneous stimulus information, such as the actors’
gender and appearance are likely to trigger stereotypes. e random pairing of stimuli ensured that
any potential confounding eects of stereotypes are random rather than systematic.
e main indirect measure was based on false recognitions (i.e., mistakes), thus ruling out the pos-
sibility that the eect was due to memorizing the materials. e conditions under which the eect
was observed closely resembled casual social media browsing. is leads us to expect that processes
of spontaneously domain recognition occur in everyday life.
5. General discussion
Social media have been dening of the past decade, introducing major changes to communication
in personal and professional seings. e vast networks that social media help maintain and the
copious inux of information are both one of their biggest advantages and one of their greatest
challenges (Donath, 2007; Resnick, 2001). With a large number of contacts and easy communication,
any information or referrals a person might need from others is likely at their ngertips. But to
tap this potential, social media users need to solve the key challenges of locating and retrieving
information. at is, at the very minimum they need to be aware of who is who and who knows
what in their networks.
In my dissertation, I examined the proposition that through the constant stream of social infor-
mation, the permanent browsing and reception of network updates via social media, people gain
ambient awareness of their online networks, including the crucial information of who is who and
who knowswhat. Two surveys focused on the phenomenon and its potential antecedents and conse-
quences. e insights were promising: People not only recognized ambient awareness as something
they experience online, but were also able to recognize and report information about people they
had only goen to know through browsing updates on a microblogging platform. ese surveys
were a clear indication that the topic is worth delving into and helped rene and ground the con-
struct. However, they did not address the most crucial assumption of the ambient awareness – that
awareness arises spontaneously, without conscious eort and deliberation. Testing this process was
the main aim of my dissertation.
To test whether ambient awareness can indeed arise spontaneously, I adapted a paradigm from psy-
chological research on spontaneous trait inferences. A series of experiments revealed that aer
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viewing social media posts people spontaneously formed accurate impressions of the actors who
had ostensibly wrien the posts. ese impressions included traits, such as reliable or unfriendly,
states, such as happy or confused, and domains of expertise, such as programmer or photogra-
pher. Another insight was that the amount of exposure and content had downstream consequences
of people’s impressions of competence and approachability. at people infer crucial information
spontaneously while browsing social media is a premise underlying most reasoning surrounding
ambient awareness and the role of social media use in information exchange and these studies are
the rst to directly test it.
5.1 Implications
Scholars have argued that nding temporally and cognitively ecient ways to maintain online net-
works is the key to unlocking their tremendous potential (Donath, 2007; Resnick, 2001). Several
insights from my work suggest that ambient awareness might be this processes. Awareness itself
is a form of social presence, which makes it a form of relational maintenance (Tong & Walther,
2011b). Several qualitative studies have described a positive association between ambient aware-
ness and relational maintenance in personal (Cornejo et al., 2013; Ito, 2005; Romero et al., 2007) and
professional contexts (Dimicco et al., 2008; Ehrlich & Shami, 2010), but lile was known about the
eciency of the underlying process. One of the main conclusions of the spontaneous inferences
projects I conducted is that ambient awareness is a cognitively ecient process occurring as a by-
product of browsing social media posts. In conditions closely resembling social media browsing,
people became more aware of the social others without being instructed to do so. Importantly, their
improved awareness was not due to memorizing entire posts, but to extracting valuable informa-
tion. is strongly suggests that for social media users, being permanently connected and exposed
to social information (Vorderer et al., 2016) does not mean drowning in noise, but rather growing
aware of their online social networks.
As to how ambient awareness can enhance knowledge exchange via social media, two processes
can been envisioned: enhancing the interpersonal processes between the parties involved in the
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exchange and enabling transactive memory to develop within a network (Fulk & Yuan, 2013). First,
improved interpersonal awareness (who is who) via trait inferences and mere exposure can make
people more comfortable approaching their weak and absent ties. In the anecdotal example from
the opening paragraphs, this was the case with a researcher nding it easier to approach a poten-
tial collaborator aer learning about their hobbies. Several of the studies I conducted suggest that
awareness can indeedmake people more comfortable approaching strangers. In the exploratory sur-
veys the association between awareness and approachability was correlational. In the experiments
on trait inferences, it was the product of minimal cues suggesting that a person is friendly, and in
the last set of experiments it was the mere exposure to a person’s posts. As previously discussed,
enhancing interpersonal relationships has broad consequences for information exchange (Leonardi
& Meyer, 2015; Levin & Cross, 2004; Lu & Yuan, 2011).
Awareness of who knows what is crucial for teams and organizations, as it supports knowedge ex-
change and the eective coordination of tasks (Austin, 2003; Treem & Leonardi, 2015). While it is
generally assumed that social media use contributes to such awareness, based on the results of my
dissertation we know one underlying process is that of spontaneous inference from passive brows-
ing. By virtue of being seamless and spontaneous, as my dissertation work suggests, ambient aware-
ness presents an interesting alternative to knowledge repositories, which are traditionally used to
enhance expertise recognition in organizations but have been criticized for not being suciently
engaging (Hinds & Pfeer, 2003). On a personal level, it can help people identify potential sources
of information and tailor directed requests, rather than broadcast to their extended networks, which
could involve disclosing sensitive information (Vitak & Ellison, 2012). Demonstrating that domain
inferences and the resulting awareness of who knows what in a network occur spontaneously helps
understand how social media contribute to information exchange (Chui et al., 2012; Fulk & Yuan,
2013) and is therefore a valuable contribution to communication and organization science.
Furthermore, expertise awareness is a core component of transactive memory, which remains one
of the major theories of group cognition (Lewis & Herndon, 2011; Wegner, 1987). So far, close re-
lationships and extended face-to-face communication have been the primary known antecedents
(Hollingshead, 1998; Lewis, 2004; Wegner et al., 1991) and digital technologies have been used as a
tool to provide awareness directly (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). e spontaneous inferences of domain
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expertise revealed in the last project of my dissertation present another possible antecedent of trans-
active memory, which is particularly relevant for computer-mediated communication, as it does not
involve face-to-face communication and external repositories.
Despite its positive implications for networkmaintenance and information exchange, ambient aware-
ness is not necessarily associated with well-being. On the contrary, awareness of negative life events
within one’s network has been linked to stress (Hampton et al., 2015). Communication with weak
ties also does not carry the emotional benets of close relationships, and can in fact have nega-
tive consequences when carried out at the expense of communication with strong ties (Burke &
Kraut, 2016). Since these emotional eects are independent of informational benets, the processes
I discuss throughout the dissertation do not contradict existing ndings on the negative emotional
eects of passive browsing (Burke & Kraut, 2016) and the cost of caring (Hampton et al., 2015).
Demonstrating that people infer domains of expertise from short descriptions of behavior as readily
and eciently as they infer traits and values, adds to the body of work on spontaneous inferences
(Uleman et al., 2008) and builds towards its conceptual understanding. e theoretical antecedents
of the phenomenon are still actively discussed and explanations typically revolve around the idea
that some information such as traits and goals is inherently valuable, as it helps us judge whether
they would aack or protect us (Skowronski et al., 2008; Moskowitz & Olcaysoy Okten, 2016). is,
however, is certainly not the case when it comes to knowing whether someone is a programmer
or a photographer. e domain inferences we observed are not readily explained by evolutionary
relevance. Instead, they suggest that the process of spontaneous inferences might be a product of
basic information processing mechanisms of information extraction (Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978).
5.1.1 Methodological innovations
For two of the projects in my dissertation I developed novel methodological approaches and made
the code freely available to other researchers (hp://github.com/anidroid). Network surveys are a
commonly used method, in which respondents list individual members of their social network and
then respond to the same set of questions for each person on the list. e Twier Network Survey
procedure I developed for the exploratory surveys allows researchers to automatically retrieve the
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prole information of members of the respondents’ Twier network and present these proles along
a set of questions. e procedure featured an additional stage of quick ltering of users (e.g., selecting
only colleagues; excluding family members, etc.).
In the domain inferences project, I developed a browser-based task in which participants view actor-
cue pairs in the form of status updates and later report impressions of the actors. e general setup
corresponds to most impression formation paradigms and can be used for various research pur-
poses. Importantly, the code allows for random pairing of stimuli (e.g., assigning a dierent actor
to a critical cue on each run). is randomization assures that the potential confounding eects of
extraneous stimulus characteristics variables are not systematically confounded with experimental
manipulations. To make the code reusable, I wrote it in a way that basic knowledge of programming
would allow other researchers to set it up, change the stimulus materials, and adapt the task to suit
their own purposes.
5.2 Limitations and future directions
e role of ambient awareness in information exchange informed and inspired the present research.
Particular ndings, such as the spontaneous inferences of who knows what and the eect of expo-
sure on familiarity and liking, carry direct implications for information exchange processes. Famil-
iarity and awareness of who knowswhat are known to facilitate information exchange. Still it would
be important to combine these insights and study the eect of ambient awareness on information-
related tasks within a coherent paradigm. One important consideration is that the eects of ambient
awareness would ultimately depend on its content. Although the eects of expertise awareness on
knowledge exchange are generally positive (Austin, 2003; Lewis & Herndon, 2011), in certain con-
ditions they can undermine people’s willingness to share (Ray et al., 2012). e role of content is
independent of the processes through which awareness arises and calls for a separate line of re-
search, for which my thesis dissertation work provides a solid foundation and suitable paradigms.
e accuracy of ambient awareness is a broad and interesting topic. In the experiment on sponta-
neous inferences, accuracy was understood as correspondence between the content of a cue and a
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subsequent impression. Whether and when social media posts provide accurate information about
the people who post them is a question of cue validity and is relevant for some but not all proposed
functions of ambient awareness. Deciding to approach an unfriendly person, because of mistakenly
assuming they are helpful might still result in receiving the needed piece of advice or information.
On the other hand, deciding to disclose sensitive information to someone who appears trustworthy
but in fact is not, can incur serious costs. ese examples serve to illustrate that albeit relevant, the
question of cue validity is separate from ambient awareness.
A related issue is that of domain knowledge versus actual competence. In the domain inference
experiments, the conceptualization of expertise was in terms of domains rather than degree of com-
petence. is conceptualization is close to the notion of knowing who knows what in order to nd
potential sources of information or referrals, and therefore of primary interest to us. Competence
is critical for particular aspects of the information exchange process (e.g., judging the credibility of
received information) and for other tasks such as expert selection. It demands further investigation.
Future research could consider the digital footprints of high and low competence (e.g., linguistic
markers, endorsements) and whether people can reliably identify them, either spontaneously or
deliberately.
e experiments I conduced showed that people spontaneously infer key information about others.
I used materials designed to contain certain types of information (traits and domains of expertise).
antifying the type of content that an actual social media user is exposed to over time can be
crucial to understanding their experience of ambient awareness. For example, the eect of frequency
of browsing social media on awareness of who knows what might be moderated by the number of
domain-related posts a person has encountered. Due to the large inux of information on social
media, standard content analysis would not be feasible and automated computational approaches
might be necessary.
6. Conclusion
rough social media, people are constantly exposed to a stream of social updates and notications
from their vast online networks. e bits of information to which people rarely devote more than
a passing glance can easily be seen as meaningless noise. e present research suggests otherwise.
Passive browsing of brief posts contributed to people’s awareness of others’ traits, activities, and
areas of expertise. It is therefore likely that by browsing social media, people can grow aware of
their online contacts even while merely ticking o notications and distractedly scrolling through
newsfeeds. e implications of this process are substantial. With the lightweight cost-ecient
means of communication aorded by social media, all information that social media users could
possibly need is likely at their ngertips. Awareness can help people access this information. is
dissertation lays the foundation of understanding ambient awareness and its role in online social
networks.
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Ambient awareness refers to the awareness social media users develop of their online network in result
of being constantly exposed to social information, such as microblogging updates. Although each indi-
vidual bit of information can seem like random noise, their incessant reception can amass to a coherent
representation of social others. Despite its growing popularity and important implications for social
media research, ambient awareness on public social media has not been studied empirically. We provide
evidence for the occurrence of ambient awareness and examine key questions related to its content and
functions. A diverse sample of participants reported experiencing awareness, both as a general feeling
towards their network as a whole, and as knowledge of individual members of the network, whom they
had not met in real life. Our results indicate that ambient awareness can develop peripherally, from
fragmented information and in the relative absence of extensive one-to-one communication. We report
the effects of demographics, media use, and network variables and discuss the implications of ambient
awareness for relational and informational processes online.
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1. Introduction
“What is happening right now?” is a question social media and
networking sites constantly ask their users. The typically brief an-
swers are then broadcasted to large audiences, often a person's
entire network on the given site. At the same time, people receive
and skim through updates from friends, relatives, acquaintances, or
even strangers. This type of communication is perhaps best char-
acterized by the incessant ﬂow of brief and mundane bits of in-
formation. Closely linked to the ubiquity of social-networking sites
andmobile devices that allow people to be permanently online and
connected, such incessant mediated communication is unprece-
dented and scholars are yet to understand its interpersonal effects
(Vorderer& Kohring, 2013). One intriguing possibility is that even if
individual updates are brief and mundane, continuously receiving
fragments of personal information can result in ambient awareness
of what is going on in the lives of people who post them. Science
writer Clive Thompson was the ﬁrst to propose how ambient
awareness can develop in the context of public social media sites,
such as Facebook and Twitter (Thompson, 2013). Ambient aware-
ness can be deﬁned as awareness of social others, arising from the
frequent reception of fragmented personal information, such as
status updates and various digital footprints, while browsing social
media. “Ambient” emphasizes the idea that the awareness develops
peripherally, not through deliberately attending to information, but
rather as an artifact of social media activity. Central to this deﬁni-
tion is that browsing social media is sufﬁcient for awareness to
develop, even in the absence of directed communication.
Prior research has looked into existing social networks, which
afford directed communication (e.g., Facebook; Lampe, Ellison, &
Steinﬁeld, 2006), making it difﬁcult to single out the contribution
of mere browsing. Several scholars have considered ambient
awareness, also referred to as peripheral or pervasive awareness, and
its potential role in relational maintenance (Lampe et al., 2006;
Resnick, 2001; Zhao, Rosson, Matthews, & Moran, 2011) and
organizational knowledge exchange (Dimicco et al., 2008; Leonardi
&Meyer, 2014; Zhao et al., 2011). However, the construct has been
discussed primarily in theoretical terms and described qualita-
tively, without being empirically assessed.
In the present research, we sought to establish an operational
deﬁnition of ambient awareness, grounding it in relevant notions
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from computer-mediated communication (CMC) and psychology
and to provide empirical data on primary questions related to its
occurrence and functions.
2. Theoretical background
In face-to-face encounters, people naturally develop awareness
of others by picking up on non-verbal cues. Co-workers who share
the same ofﬁce, for example, get a sense of each-other's daily
moods and activities. Co-presence enhances communication by
increasing familiarity and providing people with information. In
mediated communication there is no physical presence, but a sense
of social presence (i.e., quality of “being there”) and awareness can
nevertheless emerge (Tu & McIsaac, 2002; Walther & Bazarova,
2008).
We expect that browsing social media posts can also contribute
to a sense of awareness of the people who post them (ambient
awareness). A major difference from prior work is that browsing
social media is a passive, non-directed activity. In contrast, the
majority of research on social presence has focused on active,
interpersonal communication (e.g., Gunawardena & Zittle, 1997;
Walther, 2007). Since browsing is often done distractedly,
ambient awareness is rather a product of automatic social pro-
cesses, such as spontaneous inferences (Ambady & Rosenthal,
1992; Uleman, Adil Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008), than of deliber-
ately trying to get to know a person, for example through active,
communication, information seeking, or mentalizing. We know
from psychological research that people form impressions about
social others after very brief exposure to minimal content, even
without intention or awareness of doing so (Uleman et al., 2008; for
a review). Person-judgments are spontaneous and ubiquitous and
it is therefore likely that they occur during browsing. In addition to
speciﬁc impressions, the mere exposure to people's posts might
lead to greater familiarity (Bornstein, 1989; Moreland & Zajonc,
1982).
2.1. Prevalence and content of ambient awareness
Whether ambient awareness indeed develops on public social
media sites, remains to be established. In qualitative studies of
enterprise social media, that is, company-intern social media,
people have reported experiencing ambient awareness towards
their colleagues (Zhao et al., 2011). Although informative and
compelling, these subjective accounts do not provide evidence as to
whether awareness is actually present. That is, it is not clear
whether people are indeed aware of their online contacts or merely
experience a sense of awareness, but will not be able to recognize
individual members of this network. Similar problem is reﬂected in
research, where feature use (e.g., reading comments) is considered
a proxy for ambient awareness, but ambient awareness itself is not
measured (e.g., Leonardi & Meyer, 2014). Another problem is that
enterprise social media are different from public social media, in
that people use them in a work-related context, usually with the
intention to get to know or keep in touch with their colleagues.
Such clearly deﬁned context and purpose of use are not necessarily
present on public social media sites, such as Twitter and Facebook,
where use motivations and network composition are far more
diverse. Lastly, most social media platforms offer ways of active
communication (e.g., private chats and messaging), which makes it
difﬁcult to claim that any increase of awareness and familiarity is
due to mere browsing (ambient awareness).
To gain insight into whether ambient awareness can develop in
the relative absence of extensive, one-to-one communication, we
focused on the microblogging site Twitter, where content is
restricted to 140 characters and usually broadcasted to large
audiences, rather than directed towards speciﬁc individuals. Thus
our ﬁrst research questions are:
RQ1a. Do people experience ambient awareness from browsing
amicroblogging site (Twitter), in the relative absence of one-to-one
communication?
RQ1b. Is ambient awareness just a general sense of knowing, or
does it involve recognizing individuals who are known primarily
through social media?
Provided that people are indeed able to gain awareness of social
others based on social media exposure, it is important to assess
what kind of information they gain. The content of social infor-
mation is crucial for understanding its consequences.
RQ1c. What speciﬁc information do social media users have
about their online-only contacts?
2.2. Media use and relationship duration
We further set out to explore how ambient awareness relates to
media use. Network size and frequency of use inﬂuence the like-
lihood of stumbling upon the posts of a particular user and is
therefore relevant to ambient awareness. According to the theory of
electronic propinquity (Walther & Bazarova, 2008), a sense of
closeness in mediated communication develops more readily when
people have experience with the medium they are using. Ambient
awareness should therefore be higher for experienced social media
users. We consider duration and frequency of social media use as
indicators of experience.
RQ2a. What are the effects of network size andmedia use on the
general experience of ambient awareness?
Whether one would develop awareness for a speciﬁc individual
is likely inﬂuenced by how frequently one stumbles upon infor-
mation about this person. Awareness should therefore be related to
frequency of reading a person's posts (passive communication).
While active communication can be expected to contribute to
ambient awareness, important in our conceptualization is that
active communication is not imperative and that awareness can be
develop in its absence. Relationship duration is another relevant
factor. The social information processing theory (Walther, 1996)
would predict that extended periods of time and interaction are
needed for awareness to develop, whereas psychological theories
on impression formation (Uleman et al., 2008) would suggest that
short exposure is sufﬁcient.
RQ2b. How is ambient awareness of individuals inﬂuenced by
passive exposure to content, active communication, and relation-
ship duration?
2.3. Role in interpersonal relationships and information exchange
Enhancing awareness in mediated environments has been
associated with positive effects on relationships in both personal
(Cornejo, Tentori, & Favela, 2012; Ito, 2005; Liechti & Ichikawa,
2000; Romero et al., 2007) and professional context (Dourish &
Bellotti, 1992; Gross, Stary, & Totter, 2005; Liechti & Ichikawa,
2000). Similarly, social media activity can help people form
awareness of their online network in a subtle, unobtrusive way.
Some evidence for the relational signiﬁcance of ambient
awareness comes from qualitative studies on enterprise social
media. Employees who use enterprise social media have described
developing ambient awareness of their colleagues, which in turn
had a positive impact on relationships and information sharing
(Dimicco et al., 2008; Ehrlich & Shami, 2010; Zhao et al., 2011). A
recent study showed that participants who followed a person's
activity on an enterprise networking site were more satisﬁed with
subsequent information transfer from this person (Leonardi &
Meyer, 2014).
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According to the idea of ambient awareness, people pick up on
information about social others while browsing, which resembles
informal communication. Informal communication contributes to
establishing common ground (e.g., Duck, Rutt, Hoy, & Strejc, 1991);
Zhao et al., 2011), thereby making it easier to approach a person
(Ellison, Steinﬁeld, & Lampe, 2011). Apart from serving as a con-
versation starter, information about people's hobbies and profes-
sion can serve as an indication of what they are knowledgeable
about. Ambient awareness can thus help social media users identify
potential sources of information (Leonardi, 2015).
Understanding the role of ambient awareness in relational
maintenance and information exchange is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, determining whether browsing social media in-
ﬂuences perceptions of approachability and provides knowledge of
competencies is an important ﬁrst step.
RQ3a. Does ambient awareness contribute to perceptions of
approachability?
RQ3b. Do social media users develop awareness of their online-
only contacts' hobbies and interests, including professional
interests?
To address these research questions, we conducted two surveys
among users of the microblogging site Twitter and developed a
Twitter Network Survey procedure to assess awareness of speciﬁc
individuals in participants' online network. Twitter was chosen
because of the large proportion of strangers and weak acquain-
tances in personal networks, which allowed us to minimize the
effects of prior acquaintanceship and alternative means of
communication. Furthermore, content on Twitter is primarily in the
form of brief posts, ambient awareness can be studied in the rela-
tive absence of more extensive forms of communication.
3. Study 1
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Twitter network survey procedure
Participants provided informed consent and temporary access
to their Twitter account information. We displayed a list of 100
randomly selected people they follow on Twitter and asked them to
classify as many as possible and at least 50 into (a) people they
encounter primarily on Twitter (Twitter-only contacts); (b) people
they encounter outside of Twitter; (c) non-human, that is, corpo-
rate accounts, brands, promoter, spam, or other automated ser-
vices; (d) unknown, in case they could not at all recognize the
account.
A questionnaire followed, in which we assessed participants'
experience of ambient awareness, along with social media use. For
the second part of the questionnaire, we displayed individual
proﬁles (name, Twitter handle, and a proﬁle photo) of people,
whom the participants had previously classiﬁed as Twitter-only
contacts. Displaying one proﬁle at a time, we asked participants
whether they knew the targets at least somewhat or not at all.
When a target was at least somewhat known to the participant, a
number of questions about this particular target followed. The
presentation of targets (maximum 17) stopped after the participant
was able to recognize and respond to questions about 5 targets. At
the end, participants provided basic demographic information.
They were debriefed and reimbursed. Simultaneously, we used the
authentication provided by the participants to request their public
data from Twitter's API. Additional Twitter data were collected
through separate API requests and manual coding of proﬁles.
3.1.2. Participants
The survey was conducted online. US citizens were recruited
from an online panel (tellwut.com) and reimbursed according to
the panel's standards (2$). Of the 233 initial respondents, 17 were
excluded because of failing an attention check, two dropped out of
the questionnaire, and one was excluded because of having an ac-
count in Twitter for less than half a week prior to the study. The
ﬁnal sample consisted of 213 participants (56% women), with 49%
being between 18 and 34 years, 36% between 35 and 54, and 15%
over 54 years. The majority of participants were employed (41%),
self-employed (11%), or looking for work (6%). Homemaker was
another majorly represented category (16%), followed by students
(9%), unable to work (9%), and retired (6%). After excluding one
outlier, the average network size was 427 (SD ¼ 608; Mdn ¼ 135)
and the average duration of Twitter was 3.5 years (SD ¼ 2).
3.1.3. Materials
General ambient awareness: Experience. The experience of
ambient awareness towards the network in general was assessed
with a single item: “It is possible that when using Twitter, you
develop awareness of the people whose updates you follow. Even if
individual updates are short and mundane, together they might
give you an idea of the personwho posts them - what they are like,
what they do, etc. Do you experience such general awareness of the
people in your Twitter network and to what extent?” It was rated
on a continuous scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (to a great extent). The
deﬁnition of ambient awareness used in the item was based on
Thompson(2013) and reﬁned in a qualitative pretest. In the pretest,
we started with a more detailed description, featuring examples.
Following participants' feedback that the described phenomenon is
sufﬁciently clear without the additional clariﬁcations and exam-
ples, we shortened the deﬁnition.
General ambient awareness: Number of people. Participants
were asked to estimate roughly howmany people they have gotten
to know through posts and status updates. The answer scale ranged
from 1 (several people) to 5 (almost everyone) and included a sixth,
non-applicable, option.
Awareness of individual targets. During the survey procedure,
we displayed amaximumof 17 people they followed on Twitter and
asked participants whether they recognized individual proﬁles.
This was assessed with a single item: Are you familiar with this
person, ranging from 1 (not at all familiar) to 5 (very familiar). More
speciﬁc questions followed for the targets who were identiﬁed as
being at least somewhat familiar (answers 2 through 5).
Network, media use, and demographics. Relationships on
Twitter are asymmetric, that is, a user can follow somebody's ac-
tivities without being followed back, networks consist of (a) fol-
lowers, that is, people following a user or and (b) friends, people the
user follows. Being interested in the awareness users have of the
people they followed, we used the latter as an index of network
size. Time since registering on Twitter (in months) was used as a
measure of duration. The frequency of Twitter use and general
social media use were assessed on a 7-point scale ranging from 1
(once a year or less) to 7 (several times a day). Basic demographic
information (gender, age, employment status) was collected. Age
was measured on a categorical scale (18e24 years, 25e34 years,
35e44 years, 45e54 years, 55 years and over).
Information categories. The information participants had for
each target was assessed with a checklist of common person-
information categories (e.g., hobbies and interests, major life
events) and asked the participants to select all categories that
represent what they have gotten to know about each target. For
expertise awareness, we showed lists of common recreation ac-
tivities and professional sectors and asked participants to select the
ones that describe the given target's hobbies and profession,
respectively. All checklist variables (information categories and
expertise awareness) included the options other (open-ended), not
sure, and no idea.
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Approachability. Participants reported the extent to which they
ﬁnd a target to be “approachable (friendly)” on a continuous scale
from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). The term friendly was added to
clarify that approachability refers to the target's personality (i.e.,
warmth, friendliness) rather than availability (i.e., having enough
time).
Attention check. Towards the end of the questionnaire we
included a modiﬁed version of an instructional manipulation check
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), to see whether the
participants were attentive.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Ambient awareness (RQ1)
The majority of participants reported moderately high levels of
awareness for people in their Twitter network (M ¼ 5.65, Med ¼ 6,
SD ¼ 2.09), indicating that experiencing ambient awareness was
not uncommon in a diverse sample of Twitter users. To the question
of estimating how many people they have gotten to know mainly
through social media, the majority of responses (69%) were be-
tween few and more than several people, but less than half of the
network. Awareness was not only a general experience. The ma-
jority of people (80%) were able to recognize at least 5 targets
within a maximum of 17.
About half of the presented proﬁles (46%) were recognized,
which is a substantial number, considering the large network sizes
in the sample. For a selection of people identiﬁed as at least
somewhat familiar, we asked participants whether they know each
person outside of Twitter. A large number of people were only
known through Twitter (75%). Together, these ﬁndings strongly
suggest that ambient awareness can develop based on micro-
blogging content.
3.2.2. Ambient awareness of individual targets
Using the Twitter Network Survey procedure, we selected in-
dividual people from participants' own networks (targets). Targets
with close relationship to the participants (i.e., family, close friends,
and friends; 11%), were excluded from the analyses involving
awareness. Of the remaining targets, 14% were identiﬁed as very
familiar, 20% as familiar, 37% as somewhat familiar, and 28% as not
entirely unfamiliar.
3.2.3. Information about individual targets
Participants were able to report the kind of information they
had encountered about individual members of their network. The
checklist measure allowed for multiple information categories per
target. Participants reported an average of two information cate-
gories per target. The category other was used only 2% of the time,
which led us to conclude the list of categories was sufﬁciently
comprehensive. The most commonly reported categories were
information about the target's personality, career, humor, and
hobbies (Fig. 1).
One type of information with particular relevance to informa-
tion processes is expertise awareness, that is, awareness of who
knows what in one's network. Our study included a measure,
where participants indicated what a target's hobbies and profes-
sion were. The options no idea and not sure were available. Fre-
quency analyses revealed that expertise awareness was common in
the present sample. Some knowledge of targets' hobbies, profes-
sion, or both was reported for 67% of the targets.
3.2.4. Demographic, network, and media use variables (RQ2)
Linear models were used to assess whether general ambient
awareness and awareness of individual contacts varied across de-
mographic groups and network characteristics. In separate models,
each awareness variable was regressed on gender, age (as contin-
uous; centered), frequency of use, network size, and time since
registering on Twitter. Originally, we intended to include Twitter
use as predictor, but the measure was highly skewed: 74% of all
participants indicated using Twitter several times a day, which was
the highest scale point. We therefore included the more normally
distributed general social media use instead. Full models including
all interactions were tested and whenever a simple model was not
signiﬁcantly different from or superior (higher Adjusted R-squared)
to its complex counterpart, the simpler model is reported.
Model summaries can be seen in Table 1a. Frequency of media
use was associated with both indexes of ambient awareness. Par-
ticipants who used social media more frequently reported experi-
encing ambient awareness to a greater degree and weremore likely
to recognize the proﬁles of people from their Twitter network.
Network size was negatively associated with the likelihood of
recognizing individual contacts, but not with the experience of
general ambient awareness. That is, people's general experience of
ambient awareness did not seem to depend on the size of their
network but people with large networks recognized fewer indi-
vidual members of their network.
3.3. Discussion
The results of this study show that people experience a sense of
ambient awareness towards their online network. More impor-
tantly, they were able to recognize and report information about
individual people in their network, whom they know only through
the microblogging platform Twitter. This awareness of individual
online contacts suggests that ambient awareness is not only an
illusory feeling, but that people are indeed aware of what is going
on in their network. Consistent with the theory of electronic pro-
pinquity, ambient awareness was higher for frequent Twitter users.
There was also an effect of age, such that older participants re-
ported higher ambient awareness. Lastly, network size did not
relate to the general experience of awareness, but seemed to be
negatively associated with awareness of individual contacts.
Overall, Study 1 offers valuable insights into ambient awareness.
However, it is a ﬁrst, exploratory study and we cannot be certain
whether the observed patterns are reliable. Furthermore, there
were certain limitations. The survey procedure did not allow for
precisely calculating the proportion of recognized targets, because
the survey stopped after 5 targets were recognized as being at least
somewhat familiar. Another problem was the scale for measuring
Twitter use, which resulted in a highly skewed variable.
We therefore conducted a second study to strengthen the con-
clusions of Study 1 and address some of its limitations. The study
kept mostly identical in order to provide additional support for the
exploratory ﬁndings of Study 1.
Fig. 1. Distribution of information categories in Study 1. Checklist measure; multiple
categories per target were possible.
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4. Study 2
4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Procedure
The procedure was identical to Study 1, except for how we
presented individual proﬁles at the second stage of the question-
naire. Each participant saw 20 proﬁles for which they had to indi-
cate whether they recognize them. From the recognized proﬁles,
three were randomly selected and participants received additional
questions, similar to those in Study 1.
4.1.2. Participants
Recruitment and reimbursement were the same as in Study 1. Of
the 212 respondents, 64 were excluded: 63 for failing the attention
checks and one for having an account in Twitter for less than half a
week prior to the study. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 148 partici-
pants (68% female), 36% employed, 30% homemaker, 20% self-
employed or looking for work, unable to work, student, or retired
(11%, 6%, and 7%, respectively). The mean age was 41 years
(SD ¼ 12). After excluding one outlier, the mean network size was
519 (SD ¼ 634; Mdn ¼ 217) with 4 years (SD ¼ 2) average duration
of Twitter use.
4.1.3. Materials
Ambient awareness. General ambient awareness and number
of people for whom it is experienced weremeasured with the same
questions used in Study 1. For awareness of individual targets, we
used 8 items (see Table 2). The items were rated on a continuous
scale, using a slider with anchor points 1 ¼ not at all and
7 ¼ extremely. The internal consistency was moderately high
(Chronbach's alpha ¼ 0.84) and the scale was treated as
unidimensional.
Network, media use, and demographics. We changed the
assessment of Twitter use in Study 2 to hours per week spent on the
site to avoid the ceiling effect from Study 1. Age, which was a cat-
egorical variable in Study 1, was measured in years. All other vari-
ables remained unchanged.
Communication and relationship duration. Passive commu-
nication was measured by asking participants how frequently they
read tweets from the given person, from 1 (never) to 7 (all the
time). Active communication was measured with two items, one
asking how frequently the participants interacted with the target
and one asking how frequently the target interacted with the
participant, answered on scales from 1 (never) to 7 (all the time).
We additionally assessed relationship duration by asking partici-
pants for how long they have been following a given target on a
scale from 1 (less than a week) to 5 (more than a year).
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Ambient awareness
The average general awareness reported in Study 2 was 6.32
(SD ¼ 2.25). The majority of people reported experiencing ambient
awareness for between few and more than several people (75%),
but less than half of the network. These patterns were similar to
what we observed in Study 1.
Due to the revised survey procedure in Study 2, we were able to
calculate the likelihood of recognizing individual contacts. The
mean likelihood was 64% (SD ¼ 38), which again is fairly high
Table 1
Relationship between ambient awareness, demographics, and network variables.
a. Study 1 b. Study 2
General ambient awareness Ambient awareness of individuals General ambient awareness Ambient awareness of individuals
Gender 0.01 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 0.01 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08)
Age 0.10 (0.06) 0.20 (0.07)** 0.08 (0.08) 0.03 (0.08)
Network Size 0.01 (0.07) 0.31 (0.07)** 0.08 (0.09) 0.41 (0.08)**
Duration 0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 0.17 (0.08)* 0.16 (0.08)*
Media usea 0.43 (0.07)** 0.18 (0.07)** 0.38 (0.09)** 0.29 (0.08)**
Network Size  Media use 0.02 (0.09) 0.04 (0.10)
Duration of use  Media use 0.03 (0.07) 0.07 (0.09)
Gender  Media use 0.08 (0.06) 0.03 (0.08)
Age  Media use 0.14 (0.07)* 0.04 (0.11)
Network Size  Duration of use 0.21 (0.08)* 0.10 (0.10)
Gender  Network Size 0.21 (0.07)** 0.05 (0.10)
Age  Network Size 0.07 (0.07) 0.30** (0.09)
Gender  Duration of use 0.12 (0.06) 0.11 (0.09)
Age  Duration of use 0.01 (0.07) 0.08 (0.09)
Gender  Age 0.09 (0.07) 0.04 (0.08)
Observations 212 144 212 144
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.19
F Statistic
(df)
5.22** (15; 196) 3.53** (15; 128) 7.78** (5; 206) 7.67** (5; 138)
Note. General ambient awareness is awareness towards the network in general; Awareness of targets is the average awareness of individual targets (maximum 17 per
participant in Study 1 and 20 per participant in Study 2).
* p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
a General social media use in Study 1 and Twitter use in Study 2.
Table 2
Target awareness: ambient awareness of individual online-only contacts.
Items M SD
Target Awareness Scale (Chronbach's Alpha¼ 0.84)
I feel like I know what {Name} is like as a person. 4.37 1.58
{Name}’s tweets allow me to get to know him/her at least somewhat. 4.72 1.34
{Name} is a complete stranger to me.a 3.61 1.76
{Name}’s is a person, I would be able to ﬁnd a topic to talk about. 5.16 1.33
I have no idea what {Name} would be like in real life.a 3.88 1.68
I know what {Name} might be knowledgeable about. 5.06 1.42
I am aware of {Name}'s profession or professional interests. 5.14 1.59
I have an idea of what {Name}'s hobbies are. 4.24 1.69
Note. {Name} was substituted with the name and username of individual Twitter
contacts.
a Reverse-coded items.
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considering the large networks of the participants.
4.2.2. Ambient awareness of individual targets
As in Study 1, we excluded targets with close relationship to the
participants (i.e., family, close friends, and friends; 2%). In Study 2,
we included an additional 8-item measure to assess ambient
awareness of individual targets (Table 2). The average ambient
awareness of targets known only through Twitter was moderately
high (M ¼ 4.51, SD ¼ 1.05).
4.2.3. Information about individual targets
Frequencies of reported information categories can be seen in
Fig. 2. The most common categories were similar to those in Study
1. It should also be noted that in both studies, the category not sure
was chosen frequently, which is in line with the idea that ambient
awareness can be vague as well as speciﬁc.
4.2.4. Demographic, network, and media use variables (RQ2)
The analysis strategy was the same as in Study 1. Model sum-
maries can be seen in Table 1b. Consistent with what we found in
Study 1, frequency of Twitter use was positively associated with
both indexes of awareness. Network size was negatively correlated
with awareness of individual contacts but not with the general
experience of awareness. Therewas a small effect of duration of use
and an interaction between age and network size. However, these
effects were not consistent across studies, indicating that they are
likely not robust or even spurious. We do not interpret these effects
and conclude that network size and frequency of use were the only
factors with consistent effects across the two studies.
The effects of relationship duration and types of communication
were investigated on the level of individual targets. Due to the
nested nature of the data (multiple targets per participant), multi-
level models were conducted with random intercepts for partici-
pant and all factors of interest as ﬁxed effects. Ambient awareness
of the target was regressed on passive communication, active
communication with target, active communication with partici-
pant, and relationship duration. All variables were standardized. As
can be seen in Table 3, only the frequency with which participants
read the target's posts (passive communication) and interacted
with the target (active communication with target) emerged as
signiﬁcant predictors. Our data support the claim that ambient
awareness arises on the basis of frequent exposure to bits and
pieces of information (passive communication). Relationship
duration had no signiﬁcant effect on ambient awareness, suggest-
ing that awareness is not strictly dependent on extended period of
interaction.
4.2.5. Perceptions of approachability (RQ3a)
The frequency of reading a target's posts was positively associ-
ated with perceptions of approachability (b ¼ 0.32, SE ¼ 0.05,
p < 0.01). Our data indicate that ambient awareness mediated the
relationship. The frequency of reading posts was positively related
to ambient awareness (b ¼ 0.48, SE ¼ 0.05, p < 0.01) and ambient
awareness was positively related to perceptions of approachability
(b ¼ 0.53, SE ¼ 0.05, p < 0.01). To test for mediation, we regressed
perceptions of approachability on both frequency of reading posts
and ambient awareness. As can be seen in Fig. 3, the relationship
between ambient awareness and approachability remained sig-
niﬁcant while controlling for reading posts, whereas the relation-
ship between reading posts and perceptions of approachability was
reduced, as compared to the direct relationship. Although our
design was correlational the pattern suggests mediation and offers
support for the idea that browsing social media results in ambient
awareness, which has a positive impact of perceptions of
approachability.
4.2.6. Expertise awareness (RQ3b)
As in Study 1, expertise awareness was assessed by asking par-
ticipants whether they can indicate the areas of the target person's
hobbies and profession. They were also able to select not sure and
no idea if that were the case. Again, having some knowledge of
hobbies and profession was common. Knowledge of targets'
hobbies, profession, or both was reported for 85% of the targets.
Information of hobbies and profession reveal what a person is
knowledgeable about and can help social media users identify who
knows what in their network and thus locate potential sources of
information.
5. General discussion
The aim of this research was to explore the idea that the passive
browsing of social media timelines, increases the awareness that
users have of their online networks (ambient awareness). It has
been speculated but not previously demonstrated that reading
updates on social media can result in ambient awareness, that is,
familiarity with people within an online network. We conducted
two surveys and found that people experienced moderately high
levels of ambient awareness towards their network on the micro-
blogging site Twitter and were able to report speciﬁc knowledge of
people they follow on Twitter but had not met in real life.
Our research provides evidence for a central aspect of ambient
awareness, which has not been explicitly addressed in prior
research. Namely, that awareness in social networks can develop
peripherally, from fragmented information and in the relative
absence of extensive one-to-one communication. Focusing on
Twitter allowed us to demonstrate that microblogging updates are
sufﬁcient for ambient awareness to develop.
Prior qualitative work has shown that people report ambient
awareness (e.g., Zhao & Rosson, 2009), but it was not clear whether
they become only aware of some very active network members or
Fig. 2. Distribution of information categories in Study 2.
Table 3
Model summary of multi-level model of the effects of communication and
relationship duration on awareness of individuals.
Target awareness
Passive communication 0.36 (0.06)**
Relationship duration 0.07 (0.05)
Active comm with T 0.21 (0.09)*
Active comm with P 0.03 (0.08)
Observations 352
Log Likelihood 432.30
Note: Target awareness is ambient awareness of individual target
(average of 8-item scale).
Active comm with T ¼ participant interacts with target.
Active comm with P ¼ target interacts with participant.
* p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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develop a feeling for a large proportion of their network. Most
participants estimated having ambient awareness for more than
several people but less than half members of their network. This
suggests that although ambient awareness is not present for each
online contact, it is also not limited to a small number of very active
network members.
We took the assessment of ambient awareness a step further by
developing a Twitter network survey procedure through which we
selected individual people our participants followed on Twitter.
Even though the majority of participants followed hundreds of
people, they were able recognize individual members of their
online-only contacts and report speciﬁc information about them.
Contrary to the idea that ambient awareness develops over
extended periods of time, neither duration of Twitter use nor
relationship duration predicted awareness. The general experience
of ambient awareness was not inﬂuenced by network size, showing
that people with large online networks can still experience a sense
of knowing their social media contacts. However, they were less
likely to recognize and report awareness of individual contacts,
presented during the survey.
The frequency of media use was positively associated with
ambient awareness. Frequency of use can be seen as indicator of
experience, in which case the relationship is consistent with one of
the predictions of electronic propinquity theory, namely that
communicators who have experience with a given medium would
beneﬁt more from its use. Frequent use also supposes higher
exposure to content, which allows for a sense of awareness to build
up from fragmented information. The importance of frequent
exposure is also seen on an individual level, where the ambient
awareness of speciﬁc target was predicted by how often the
participant received updates from the target (passive
communication).
Most commonly reported was knowledge of personality, humor,
hobbies, and career. The prevalence of personality and humor
awareness is in line with the well-documented spontaneity of trait
inferences (Uleman et al., 2008). Information about hobbies and
career reveals what people are interested in and knowledgeable
about. Apart from serving as topic for conversation, this informa-
tion can allow social media users to gain awareness of who knows
what in their network (Leonardi, 2015).
5.1. Limitations and future research
The present research is descriptive and largely exploratory.
Although we provide converging data from two studies, additional
research is needed to validate and further understand the effects
we observed. We identiﬁed potential antecedents and moderators
of ambient awareness, but the data were correlational. Future
research can adopt methods that allow for a closer inspection of
underlying processes.
The research relied on self-reported information regarding
participants' own networks. While the method contributed to the
ecological validity of the research, it posed restrictions to extent to
which the accuracy of responses can be determined. One question
is whether the participants' responses indeed reﬂected their actual
impressions of the targets, as opposed to being formed on the spot,
when participants were asked to report them. Future studies could
use constructed materials and multiple judgments to deﬁnitively
resolve these issues.
5.2. Implications
Online networks are unprecedented in size and structure. Their
vastness and diversity create a potential for gaining enormous
relational and information beneﬁts (Donath, 2007), but pose a
serious challenge to traditional relational maintenance strategies
(Tong & Walther, 2011). As with other forms of ambient contact
(e.g., Ito, 2005; Romero et al., 2007), ambient awareness is envi-
sioned as a cognitively efﬁcient process contributing to relational
communication. Many have discussed the potentially negative ef-
fects of frequent media use when it serves as recurring distraction
or leads to information overload. Seeing ambient awareness as
cognitively efﬁcient is not necessarily at odds with these ﬁndings.
Rather, the efﬁciency stems from ambient awareness developing
without cost or effort beyond what is already invested in browsing,
which does not imply that browsing social media is in itself an
efﬁcient process.
One way in which awareness relates to social processes is
through providing people with information about others. Such in-
formation can serve as a basis of ﬁrst impressions and result in a
sense of familiarity, both of which can make a target appear more
approachable. This idea is supported by our data. In addition to
perceptions of familiarity and approachability, ambient awareness
can make it easier to approach others by providing topics for con-
versation. For example, somebody's social media activity can reveal
that the person is an avid Joy Division fan or has recently visited a
tropical island, both of which can easily serve as conversation
starters. On an even more practical side, picking up on cues that
somebody is stressing over an upcoming deadline is a good indi-
cation that this person might not be able or willing to respond
promptly if approached.
The relational effects of ambient awareness can be linked to
informational processes, because the relationship between an in-
formation seeker and source is essential to information exchange. A
recent study demonstrated that connecting to a person on social
media facilitated subsequent information transfer from this person
(Leonardi & Meyer, 2014). The authors turn to ambient awareness
to explain the link between browsing and facilitated social inter-
action, but do not speciﬁcally assess ambient awareness. By
demonstrating that ambient awareness mediated the relationship
between the frequency of reading microblogging updates and
perceptions of approachability, we complement their ﬁndings and
offer further support for the proposed process.
As discussed earlier, online network provide abundant valuable
Passive 
communication Approachability 
Ambient awareness 
β = .09, SE = .05, p  = .09 
(β = .32, SE = .05, p < .01) 
β = .49, SE = .05, p  < .001 
β = .48, SE = .05, p  < .001 
Fig. 3. The mediating role of ambient awareness on perceptions of approachability.
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information, but ﬁnding efﬁcient ways to navigate them and suc-
cessfully locate information is a challenge. We found that ambient
awareness involves information about hobbies and profession.
Such information can enable social media users to develop a
cognitive map of who knows what in their online network.
Awareness of who knows what offers a potential solution to the
problem of locating valuable information without needing to post
public or widely shared requests. The role of expertise or knowl-
edge awareness (who knows what) in information processes has
been discussed widely in the context of collaborative work and
knowledge exchange in organizations (e.g., Engelmann, Dehler,
Bodemer, & Buder, 2009), but not with regard to public social
media. The potential of bridging these lines of inquiry is substantial,
as networks on public social media are virtually unlimited and far
more diverse than organizational or other professional networks.
6. Conclusion
Computers and mobile devices are with us at every step of our
daily lives (Vorderer, 2015). Social media and networking sites
broadcast bits of information about every member of our increas-
ingly large and diverse online networks. Often meaningless in
isolation, these bits can easily be seen as random noise and clutter.
Without questioning the potentially problematic effects of being
permanently connected, we focused on how this incessant contact
enhances our digital lives. This research is a ﬁrst step towards un-
derstanding the intriguing construct of ambient awareness. We
demonstrate that browsing social media and frequently encoun-
tering various social information allows social media users to gain
awareness of what is going on in the lives of people in their online
network. The efﬁcacy, scope, and functionality of ambient aware-
ness are yet to be established. We provide evidence that browsing
microblogging updates is sufﬁcient for awareness to develop and
highlight ways in which it can help bring about relational and
informational beneﬁts of online networks.
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Article
Spontaneous Trait Inferences
on Social Media
Ana Levordashka1 and Sonja Utz1
Abstract
The present research investigates whether spontaneous trait inferences occur under conditions characteristic of social media and
networking sites: nonextreme, ostensibly self-generated content, simultaneous presentation of multiple cues, and self-paced
browsing. We used an established measure of trait inferences (false recognition paradigm) and a direct assessment of impres-
sions. Without being asked to do so, participants spontaneously formed impressions of people whose status updates they saw.
Our results suggest that trait inferences occurred from nonextreme self-generated content, which is commonly found in social
media updates (Experiment 1) and when nine status updates from different people were presented in parallel (Experiment 2).
Although inferences did occur during free browsing, the results suggest that participants did not necessarily associate the traits
with the corresponding status update authors (Experiment 3). Overall, the findings suggest that spontaneous trait inferences
occur on social media. We discuss implications for online communication and research on spontaneous trait inferences.
Keywords
spontaneous trait inferences, false recognition, social media, Internet/cyberpsychology, impression formation, person perception
Social media allow people to communicate at virtually no cost
and effort and build large online networks, which can be pow-
erful sources of social and emotional support (Donath, 2007).
The challenge lies in finding successful ways to maintain and
navigate those networks, since their size and diversity render
traditional maintenance strategies, such as face-to-face com-
munication, less feasible (Resnick, 2001; Tong & Walther,
2011). Snap social processes like spontaneous inferences pres-
ent a potential solution. Research has shown that people spon-
taneously infer traits, goals, and values from minimal exposure
to information (Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). Social
media offer a near constant stream of information, and if infer-
ences indeed require no more than a passing glance, browsing
might help users gain awareness of their online networks
(Levordashka & Utz, 2016; Thompson, 2008). However, the
extent to which such snap inferences are made online is not
clear. We examine key conditions that could hinder sponta-
neous inferences on social media and report experiments
designed to test whether inferences occur under these
conditions.
In research on online impression formation, it is common to
explicitly ask participants to judge others, whose profiles they
view at their own pace (e.g., Antheunis & Schouten, 2011;
Back et al., 2010; Evans, Gosling, & Carroll, 2008; Gosling,
Augustine, Vazire, Holtzman, & Gaddis, 2011; Pennington &
Hall, 2014; Westerman, Van Der Heide, Klein, & Walther,
2008). In contrast to this deliberate evaluation, browsing
involves skimming through information without any particular
intention. Even if the encountered posts contain relevant cues,
we do not know whether these cues will lead to inferences
when people encounter them briefly and without explicit
impression formation goals.
There is robust evidence that people spontaneously infer
social information and form impressions (Ambady &
Rosenthal, 1992; Uleman et al., 2008), which can persist over
time and affect behavior (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, &
Hall, 2005; Todorov & Uleman, 2004). Here, we focus on
behavioral descriptions as a cue (Carlston, Skowronski, &
Sparks, 1995; Uleman et al., 2008). Studies have shown that
when reading about others’ behavior, people make inferences
even when their task is unrelated to impression formation or
when they are under high cognitive load (Todorov & Uleman,
2003). Status updates often contain trait-implying information
and can therefore be expected to produce similar effects. How-
ever, the evidence for spontaneous trait inferences comes from
laboratory experiments with conditions that differ from social
media in important ways.
Spontaneous trait inference experiments typically use third-
party descriptions (Rim, Uleman, & Trope, 2009; Saribay,
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Rim, & Uleman, 2012; Todd, Molden, Ham, & Vonk, 2011),
which are particularly powerful in driving impressions. Even
when first-person descriptions are used (e.g., Carlston et al.,
1995), the information is provided to the participants with no
context, and there is little reason to doubt its accuracy. Social
media updates, however, are self-generated and shared volun-
tarily, which makes them less reliable due to strategic self-
presentation (warranting principle; Utz, 2010; Walther, Van
Der Heide, Kim, Westerman, & Tong, 2008).
Moreover, the information in laboratory experiments can be
of rather extreme nature. Behaviors such as ‘‘She threw a chair
at her classmate’’ (Bliss-Moreau, Barrett, & Wright, 2008) or
‘‘I kicked [a puppy] out of my way’’ (Carlston & Skowronski,
1994; Carlston et al., 1995; McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011) are
used as stimuli, but would rarely be shared online, where infor-
mation tends to be more mild and appropriate (Utz, 2014). This
is problematic because extreme information is known to influ-
ence impressions more strongly (Fiske, 1980; Skowronski &
Carlston, 1989). Indeed, researchers have speculated that too
mild content might not result in spontaneous inferences (Skow-
ronski, Carlston, & Hartnett, 2008).
Another major difference lies in how information is pre-
sented. Nearly, all experiments on spontaneous trait inferences
present only one pair of actor and behavior at a time. Forming a
distinct association under such conditions is more straightfor-
ward than on social media, where different actors and beha-
viors appear in parallel and users browse through without
being particularly attentive. A social media user could easily
be looking at one person, while still processing information
about another, especially while browsing.
Since updates on social media are self-generated and often
mild in content, it is not clear whether they will be sufficiently
powerful as a cue to produce spontaneous inferences. Further-
more, viewing multiple updates in parallel and in ‘‘browse’’
mode might hinder the associative process. In a series of
experiments, we tested whether people will spontaneously infer
traits from mild, self-generated social media updates (Experi-
ment 1), when information is presented in parallel (Experiment
2) and merely browsed through (Experiment 3).
General Method
Overview
We adapted an established trait-inference paradigm (false rec-
ognition; Todorov & Uleman, 2002). The paradigm assesses
trait inferences via a recognition task. First, participants see a
number of actors paired with brief trait-implying descriptions.
They are asked to read the descriptions without any mention of
impression formation (learning phase). In a subsequent recog-
nition task, the same actors are paired with single words, and
for each pair, participants indicate whether the word appeared
in the actor’s description. It has been shown that if the target
word is the trait implied by the actor’s description, participants
make more mistakes saying that it was in the description
(Todorov & Uleman, 2002). This false recognition of implied
traits occurs because, while reading the descriptions, partici-
pants spontaneously infer the implied traits and associate them
with the corresponding authors. When developing the para-
digm, researchers adopted additional control conditions and
counterbalancing to rule out alternative explanations, such as
mere word activation, and effects of extraneous characteristics
of the stimuli. It was consistently demonstrated that the
counterbalancing had no effect, which led the authors and
other researchers employing the paradigm to drop the
counterbalancing.
We followed the same procedure but changed the content
and presentation of stimuli. The stimuli were social media
updates, ostensibly posted by the actor (self-generated) and
nonextreme (appropriate) in content. Experiment 1 followed
the original paradigm but with status updates as stimuli. In
Experiment 2, we used the same content and varied the number
of updates presented simultaneously. In Experiment 3, partici-
pants browsed through all updates at their own pace. Our pri-
mary dependent variable was the number of mistakes (false
recognitions). Whether trait inferences will be made in these
conditions is an open question. What we hypothesize and test
in each experiment is that if trait inferences occur, participants
will make more mistakes for implied traits as compared to other
traits.
Prior research has assessed response times (RTs) to correct
trials. Since longer RTs can be indicative of greater difficulty,
it can be expected that if spontaneous inferences are made, RTs
to implied traits should be longer. Although there has been
some supporting evidence, RTs are not a reliable indicator of
trait inferences. Nevertheless, to be consistent with prior work,
we recorded and reported RTs. In addition to false recognitions,
we developed an alternative assessment of impressions.
We report how we determined sample size, all data exclu-
sions, manipulations, and measures (Simmons, Nelson, &
Simonsohn, 2012). The design and hypotheses were preregis-
tered (osf.io/jqhdz). The experiments were designed in Psy-
choPy (Peirce, 2007) and analyzed in R (R Core Team,
2015). The research was approved by an ethics committee.
We conducted pilot research for Experiments 1 and 2, which
is not reported here, but a report is available online (Levor-
dashka, 2016). The results are consistent with the remaining
experiments and including them in the article would not have
altered our conclusions.
Sample
The effect sizes in spontaneous trait inferences experiments
using the false recognition paradigm are moderately large
(Todorov & Uleman, 2002). A sample of 16 participants would
have been sufficient to achieve statistical power of 0.95 in a two-
tailed dependent-samples t-test. We have decided on larger sam-
ples to ensure power of at least 0.90 for effect sizes of dz¼ 0.60.
For all experiments, participants were recruited from the
participant pool of a German research institute. Some experi-
ence with social media was called for during recruitment but
not subsequently assessed. Since prior research has not found
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gender differences in spontaneous impression formation, we did
not consider it necessary to discriminate participants based on
their gender to ensure a balanced sample. Gender distribution
is reported per experiment. Other demographic information was
collected separately and reported for the sample across experi-
ments. The participants were undergraduate students of various
faculties (no discipline was represented by more than 10%). Age
ranged from 19 to 34 years (M ¼ 24, SD ¼ 3).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Thirty participants took part in the study (22 female). After pro-
viding an informed consent, participants received instructions
and completed the study on individual computer screens. The
total duration was 15 min. At the end, participants were
debriefed and reimbursed (2 EUR).
Procedure
Participants saw 36 social media updates (Figure 1), which they
were asked to read carefully (learning phase). On each trial, a
single update was presented for 5 s. In the recognition task, par-
ticipants saw each face from the learning phase, paired with a
word, and had to indicate as quickly as possible whether the
word had appeared in the status update of the person (old word)
or whether it is a new word that was not in the update. For
example, if person A’s description was ‘‘Just spilled coffee all
over my laptop!’’ and in the test phase person A appeared with
the word laptop, the correct response would be old; any word
that was not in the update (e.g., clumsy) would be a new word.
The presentation order of single trials was randomized in each
task and for each participant.
For the updates, we used 36 sentences (in German), 12 of
which mentioned a personality trait and 24 implied a trait with-
out explicitly mentioning it. The associations between sen-
tences and implied traits were pretested. The number of
positive and negative sentences was balanced.
The sentences were randomly paired with 36 faces from
Bainbridge, Isola, and Oliva (2013). We used equal number
of male and female faces of similar attractiveness and memor-
ability (based on the ratings from the database).
For the recognition task, each face was paired with a word.
Everyone faces whose status update mentioned a trait were
paired with this same trait (presented trait). The remaining 24
sentences were split into three groups: eight faces were paired
with the trait implied by the status update of the same actor
(implied-trait condition); eight faces with the trait that was
implied by a status update of another actor (other-trait condi-
tion); eight faces with a novel trait (control-trait condition).
Presented-trait trials served as fillers and were not analyzed.
The correct response to all other trials was new. Responses old
were coded as errors (false recognitions).
Memory of Stimuli
We assessed participants’ memory for the sentences form the
learning phase in a recall task. Participants saw a random selec-
tion of six faces and had to type the corresponding updates. The
responses were coded by research assistants unaware of the
study design. The scale for accuracy was: 0 ¼ no response,
1¼ not at all accurate, 2¼ accurate meaning; mistakes in word-
ing, 3 ¼ mostly accurate, 4 ¼ accurate. Another item assessed
whether participants recalled a sentence but paired it with the
wrong target. If a participant’s response was a somewhat accu-
rate recollection of one of the stimulus sentences but not that of
the target face, the response was coded as mistaken target.
Intercoder reliability was estimated on 20% of the responses,
with ratings from two coders (intraclass correlation coefficient
[ICC] ¼ .93, 95% confidence interval [CI] [0.83, 0.97]).
Direct Assessment of Impressions
Participants were asked to evaluate some of the actors (n ¼ 12
per participant) from the learning phase. On each trial, they saw
a face, paired with two traits: The trait implied by the status
update and another trait of the same valence and had to choose
one of the traits to evaluate the person. This assessment of
impressions was an additional measure of trait inferences.
Excluded Cases
Our a priori criterion was 3 SD above or below the sample
mean for each measure in the study. There were no outliers.
One participant made no correct responses in the implied-
trait condition. Since the RT analyses were based on correct
trials, this resulted in missing data. To ensure a balanced
design, we excluded this participant from the RT analysis.
Alternative approaches (replacing the missing data with the
participant’s average RTs in the other conditions or with the
average RTs of other participants in the missing condition)
yielded similar results.
Results
We used paired-sample t-tests to test our hypothesis regarding
false recognition rates (Table 1). Participants made more mis-
takes when an actor’s face was paired with the trait implied for
this actor (implied-trait condition; M ¼ 0.55, SD ¼ 0.24) as
compared to a trait implied for another actor (other-trait condi-
tion; M ¼ 0.34, SD ¼ 0.22) or a novel trait (control condition;
M ¼ 0.23, SD ¼ 0.17). This pattern suggests that people
Figure 1. Example of status update stimulus. The actual stimulus had a
different face and name, and the text was in German.
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spontaneously inferred traits when reading status updates with
mild content, written from a first-person perspective.
Average RTs to correct trials ranged between 1.03 and 3.24
s (M ¼ 2.15, Mdn ¼ 2.22, SD ¼ 0.54). The data violated
assumptions of normality. We performed a log10 transforma-
tion on the row data (RTs per trial). To avoid negative values,
we added 1.0 to all values prior to the transformation. Follow-
ing the transformation, the data no longer violated assumptions
of normality and equal variances (Shapiro Wilk’s ps > .06;
Levene’s test ps > .1). There were no significant differences
in RTs (all ps > .087).
The recall of the stimulus material was low. For 40% of the
trials, participants were not able to recall anything and 42% of
the recalled sentences were classified as ‘‘not at all accurate.’’
As we expected, participants occasionally recalled the status
update of a person other than the one whose picture was dis-
played. This however occurred in only 16% of the cases, which
indicates that overall retention of the stimuli was indeed low.
The occurrence of spontaneous inferences was apparent in the
direct evaluations measure. When asked to evaluate the actors
from the learning task, participants selected the implied trait over
another trait of the same valence 62% of the time. An exact bino-
mial sign test indicated that this was significantly higher than
chance, 95% CI [0.55, 0.69], p¼ .001. Given the low recall, this
preference is likely due to implicit evaluation based on the
actor’s update rather than direct recall of the update.
Discussion
The results of this experiment show that the content typically
encountered on social media can result in spontaneous trait infer-
ences. These inferences were reflected in the outcome of a word
recognition task: Participants were more likely to falsely recog-
nize a word as having been previously mentioned in an actor’s
status update, when the word was the trait implied by the update,
as compared to traits implied for other actors and to novel traits.
We also found that when directly asked to evaluate a person,
participants were more likely to choose the trait, implied by this
person’s update. Importantly, this likelihood was higher than
what the memory of stimulus materials would suggest. That
is, participants’ evaluations were driven by status updates they
had previously seen but could likely no longer recall.
In sum, we provide evidence for trait inferences on the basis
of ostensibly self-generated status updates. However, the pos-
sibility remains that if too much information is presented at
once, there will not be clear associations and person-specific
inferences. The following experiment was designed to address
this concern.
Experiment 2
Method
Nineteen participants took part in the experiment (16 female).
The recruitment, procedure, stimuli, and measures were identi-
cal to that in Experiment 1, with the exception of how we pre-
sented the stimuli. Instead of one at a time, participants saw
nine updates in each of the four trials (60 s per trial). In the test
phase, the implied-trait condition remained unchanged. There
were two comparison conditions: Faces paired with traits
implied by other updates from the same trial and faces paired
with traits from other trials.
There were no outliers based on the three SD criterion. One
participant had to be excluded from the analysis of RTs because
they made no correct responses in the implied-trait condition,
which resulted in missing data.
Results
The number of false recognitions differed significantly across
conditions (Table 2). Participants made considerably more mis-
takes when an actor’s face was paired with the trait implied for
this actor (implied-trait condition; M ¼ 0.57, SD ¼ 0.23), as
compared to a trait implied for another actor in the same trial
(M ¼ 0.3, SD ¼ 0.15) or another trial (M ¼ 0.29, SD ¼
0.18). There was no significant difference between the two con-
trol conditions. Crucial here is the difference in false recogni-
tions between traits implied by status updates that were
presented during the same trial. Although the updates appeared
simultaneously, the trait implied by each update was specifi-
cally associated with the person who posted the update.
RTs to correct trials ranged between 1.1 and 5.59 s (M¼ 2.46,
Mdn¼ 2.41, SD¼ 0.99). Due to violated assumptions of normal-
ity,weperformeda log10 transformation onRTsper trial (1.0was
added to all values). Following log transformation, the data no
longer violated the assumptions of normality and equal variances
(ShapiroWilk’s ps > .09; Levene’s test ps > .79). RTs for correct
responses for implied-trait trials (M ¼ 3.11, SD ¼ 0.92) were
shorter than in the other two conditions (same trial: M ¼ 3.49,
SD¼ 0.97; other trial:M ¼ 3.46, SD ¼ 1.01; Table 3).
The recall of status updates was low. On the majority of
trials, participants provided no response (47%) or a highly inac-
curate response (28%). There were some cases of recalled
update but a mistaken target (18%), which shows that partici-
pants recalled more than their raw memory scores suggest.
Even when considering these cases, the overall recall was low.
Despite having poor recall of the seen updates, when asked
to evaluate an actor, participants chose the implied trait over
another trait of the same valence 75% of the time, which was
significantly higher than chance, 95% CI [0.66, 0.82], p <
.0001. These results provide evidence that participants made
actor-specific trait inferences.
Table 1. Results of Dependent-Samples t-Tests Comparing False Rec-
ognition Rates across Conditions (Experiment 1).
Comparison df t Sig. (Two Tailed) Hedges’ g [95% CI]
Implied–other 28 4.15 <.001 0.89 [0.41, 1.4]
Implied–control 28 6.21 <.001 1.47 [0.89, 2.13]
Other–control 28 2.93 .007 0.52 [0.15, 0.91]
Note. CI ¼ confidence interval.
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Discussion
Experiment 2 provided evidence that the simultaneous presen-
tation of status updates can result in distinct, actor-specific
inferences. Participants were more likely to falsely recognize
an implied trait as having been previously presented, which
indicated that they spontaneously inferred the trait. They were
also more likely to associate an actor with the trait implied by
this actor’s update, without necessarily being able to recall the
update. We did not find the expected differences in RTs.
Unique to this experiment is the demonstration that when par-
ticipants viewed updates simultaneously, the traits they inferred
from each updatewere distinctly associatedwith the author of the
update andnotwith theother actorswhosepicture andupdate they
viewed at the same time. However, the experimental setup does
not rule out the possibility that browsing poses a boundary condi-
tion to this association. We therefore conducted a third experi-
ment, in which participants browsed through the updates at
their own pace in a setup that closely resembled social media.
Experiment 3
Method
Forty-five participants took part in the study (37 female).
Recruitment was identical to that in previous experiments and
we used a similar procedure. The stimulus material was the
same as in the previous experiments, but instead of presenting
the status updates in discrete trials for fixed amount of time, all
updates appeared on a time line and participants could scroll
through for as long as they like. They were instructed to mark
the updates they found interesting and proceed when ready
(browsing time was recorded). In the test phase, the experimen-
tal conditions were the same as in Experiment 1: implied trait,
other trait, and a novel trait.
Scenario-Based Evaluation Measure
We developed a novel scenario-based measure of direct
impressions. On each of four trials, participants read a situation
and were asked to make a choice between two people. The
situations were such that a person with certain trait would be
preferred (e.g., ‘‘Who would you rather give your house key
to?’’ would likely be somebody who is trustworthy rather than
unreliable). For each question, participants had a choice
between two actors: one for which the desired trait was implied
and one for which an opposite trait was implied. We compared
the likelihood of choosing a person with a desired trait over a
person with an undesired trait. To control for the influence of
faces, for every pair of actors in a scenario, we swapped the
traits implied during the learning phase. This manipulation was
done between participants. That is, already in the learning
phase, for half of the participants, person A was paired with the
desired trait and, for the other half, person A was paired with
the undesired trait.
Excluded Cases
There were no outliers in the false recognitions measure and
one RT outlier, who was excluded from the RT analysis. We
excluded one more participant from the RT analysis due to
missing data: They had no correct responses in the implied-
trait condition.
Results
On average, participants spent 2.42 (SD¼ 1.19) min browsing
the updates, which is an average of 4 s per update. They
marked 20% (SD ¼ 15) of the updates as interesting. Brows-
ing time was positively correlated with memory of the stimu-
lus updates (r ¼ .32, p ¼ .032) but not with error rates
(r ¼ .18, p ¼ .243). The number of interesting updates was
positively correlated with browsing time (r ¼ .51, p < .001).
All zero-order correlations are reported in the supplemental
material.
The pattern of means was consistent with our previous
findings: higher number of error rates in the implied-trait con-
dition (M ¼ 0.43, SD ¼ 0.25) as compared to other-trait (M ¼
0.37, SD ¼ 0.21) and control (M ¼ 0.24, SD ¼ 0.19). The dif-
ference between implied and other-traits was small and only
approaching significance (Table 4). Given that the means are
in line with our hypothesis and a one-sided test (justified by
our preregistered directional prediction) would have been sig-
nificant, we consider that spontaneous inferences did occur.
There was also a significant difference between the other- and
control-trait condition, which we did not find in the previous
experiments. If we are to interpret this pattern according to
Todorov and Uleman (2002), we would conclude that infer-
ences occurred (the least mistakes were made for novel traits)
but were not successfully bound to corresponding faces (no
difference between correctly paired trait-face trials, i.e.,
Table 3. Results of Dependent-Samples t-Tests Comparing RTs
across Conditions (Experiment 2).
Comparison df t
Sig.
(Two Tailed) Hedges’ g [95% CI]
Implied–other (st) 17 4.91 <.001 .42 [.67, .21]
Implied–other (ot) 17 2.92 .010 .39 [.72, .1]
Other(st)–other (ot) 17 0.25 .805 .03 [.22, .28]
Note. st ¼ same trial; ot ¼ other trial; CI ¼ confidence interval.
Table 2. Results of Dependent-Samples t-Tests Comparing False Rec-
ognition Rates Across Conditions (Experiment 2).
Comparison df t
Sig.
(Two Tailed)
Hedges’ g [95%
CI]
Implied–other (st) 18 6.17 <.001 1.32 [0.75, 2]
Implied–other (ot) 18 5.14 <.001 1.3 [0.67, 2.03]
Other (st)–other (ot) 18 0.35 .734 0.08 [0.38, 0.54]
Note. st ¼ same trial; ot ¼ other trial; CI ¼ confidence interval.
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implied trait condition, and mismatched pairs, that is other-
trait condition).
RTs to correct trials ranged between 0.84 and 3.78 s (M ¼
2.04, Mdn ¼ 1.96, SD ¼ 0.69). Following a log10 transforma-
tion (per trial; 1.0 added to each value), the data no longer vio-
lated the assumptions of normality and equal variances
(Shapiro Wilk’s ps > .02; Levene’s test ps > .11). Only the dif-
ference between implied and novel traits was significant, t(43)
¼ 2, p ¼ .052 (all other ps > .146).
The recall of status updates was low. Responses were mostly
absent (45%) or highly inaccurate (41%). Occasionally, partici-
pants recalled the sentence of a different actor from the data set
(17%).
The results of our scenario-based assessment offer support
for the occurrence of trait inferences. Across four different sce-
narios, participants selected the actor whose status update
implied a trait that would be desirable in the particular scenario
61% of the times, which was significantly higher than chance,
95% CI [0.54, 0.68], p ¼ .002.
Discussion
Evidence for spontaneous inference during browsing was
found in the direct evaluation measure. In the false recognition
measure, the difference between the implied- and other-trait
conditions was not significant. According to the traditional
interpretation of the paradigm, this pattern suggests that infer-
ences occurred (the least mistakes were made for novel traits)
but were not successfully bound to corresponding faces, as
indicated by the small difference between correctly paired
trait-face trials (implied-trait condition) and mismatched pairs
(other-trait condition). However, it is not clear whether this pat-
tern is robust. The pattern of means corresponds to what was
found in the first two experiments and we found evidence for
inferences in the alternative measure, which renders the possi-
bility that the effect was present but weaker.
General Discussion
The information social media users encounter online is rich in
social cues. Psychological research on first impressions sug-
gests that even without attending to the social aspects of infor-
mation, users might form impressions based on that
information. Despite this possibility and its implications, spon-
taneous inferences have not been studied in the context of
social media. We provide evidence that trait inferences occur
spontaneously from content and under conditions resembling
social media (Figure 2).
Participants spontaneously formed impressions on the basis
of single, nonextreme, ostensibly self-generated status updates
without being instructed to do so. Our research supports the
robustness of spontaneous trait inferences and their relevance
for online communication.
Prior research has shown that person inferences are uninten-
tional, cognitively efficient, long-lasting, and can be of traits
but also values, goals, or intentions (Uleman et al., 2008). This
makes them highly relevant for online communication, where
information is often merely glanced at. Our work is an impor-
tant first step toward examining the impact of spontaneous
impression formation on relational and informational processes
online.
We used an established measure of trait inference. Using a
previously validated measure strengthens the conclusions we
can draw from the research. This particular measure requires
the use of cues that do not explicitly contain the target impres-
sion, which limits the possibility of conducting research with
nonconstructed stimuli (e.g., posts directly taken from social
media). We therefore included alternative assessments, which
involved choosing traits to describe an actor and choosing
between two actors for a scenario that calls for the trait implied
for one of the actors. The outcomes of these alternative mea-
sures were consistent with the false-recognitions measure,
which offers support for their effectiveness.
Framing a spontaneous-inferences paradigm in a social
media setting is another innovation, which can be helpful for
future research. Social media provides a realistic setting for
research on spontaneous inferences, with possibility to manip-
ulate social context and integrate additional tasks in a smooth
way that is intuitive and familiar for the participants.
The experiment in which we investigated impressions dur-
ing browsing provided evidence for actor-specific trait infer-
ences on scenario-based measure of inferences but had
inconclusive results on the recognition measure. Participants
were more likely to falsely recognize previously implied
traits (as compared to novel traits), regardless of whether
they were paired with the person who posted them or another
person from the stimulus set. This pattern suggests that peo-
ple inferred traits from status updates but did not necessarily
associate these traits with their corresponding authors. One
explanation of this would be that while browsing, people paid
more attention to the content itself rather than who posted it.
This would be an interesting result, but we cannot firmly
assess its robustness, which we acknowledge as a limitation
of our present work. The extent to which people form
actor-specific inferences while browsing is an important
future direction. If future research reproduced the pattern
where only novel traits are less likely to be falsely recog-
nized, it would be important to investigate the conditions
under which actor-specific inferences do occur.
One limitation of this and prior research is the handling of
extraneous characteristics of the stimulus material (e.g., faces).
Prior research has included replication conditions with
Table 4. Results of Dependent-Samples t-Tests Comparing False Rec-
ognition Rates across Conditions (Experiment 3).
Difference df t
Sig.
(Two Tailed) Hedges’ g [95% CI]
Same–other 45 1.94 .058 0.28 [0.01, 0.57]
Same–control 45 5.33 <.001 0.86 [0.5, 1.24]
Other–control 45 4 <.001 0.62 [0.29, 0.96]
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differently paired stimuli and shown that the pairing does not
influence the overall effects, which led the researchers to drop
the replication conditions from future work (Todorov & Ule-
man, 2003). However, the means of assessing that (through
replication conditions which double the sample size) are not
optimal. It would be possible to program studies in a way that
randomizes stimulus pairs at each run thus reducing extraneous
effects to random noise.
Bringing together research on snap social judgment and
online impression formation opens up important directions for
future work. Clearly, there is more to social media than what
our experiments aimed to capture. Under conditions of true
information overload, the ability of cues to attract attention
might matter more than it did in the present research, thus it
will be important to reproduce the effect under even more
cognitively demanding conditions. Another direction for
future studies we have already mentioned is whether and how
spontaneous inferences can help users navigate and maintain
their vast online networks. Examining the accuracy of infer-
ences will be important for understanding such interpersonal
effects.
Conclusion
There are many reasons to browse the streams of updates on
social media sites—to kill time, to catch up on current events,
to have a laugh at a friend’s joke. The present research sug-
gests that, without necessarily having the intention to do so,
people form impressions of others. These spontaneous pro-
cesses paint a different picture of what browsing social media
might entail. While scrolling down to catch a colleague’s
most recent pun about conference deadlines, a social media
user might also be picking up bits of information that shape
her perceptions of people from various corners of her vast
online networks.
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Appendix C
 Spontaneous trait inferences on social media: Report of Experiments 1A and 2A 
Ana Levordashka and Sonja Utz 
Leibniz-Institut für Wissensmedien 
 
We conducted a series of experiments testing the occurance of spontaneous trait inferences in conditions, 
resembling social media. The main experiments are reported elsewhere. Here we report two additional 
experiments, which were not included in the paper due to similarity in design and in order to avoid redundancy. 
Their results are consistent with what is reported in the paper. This is a brief report. For more extensive 
literature review and discussion, please see the main report: Levordashka & Utz, 2016, June. Main report. 
Retrieved from osf.io/56sn2 
 
Brief overview of research background and aims 
Psychological research has shown that even minimal exposure to information can result in meaningful, 
lasting impressions (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992; Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). Such spontaneous 
impressions can play an important role on social media, as they can allow users to gain awareness of their 
unprecedentedly large online networks (Donath, 2007; Resnick, 2001). However, the extent to which 
spontaneous trait inferences are made on social media is not clear. 
Existing research has focused on deliberate impressions. Participants are asked to form impressions of 
others, whose profiles they view at their own pace (e.g., Antheunis & Schouten, 2011; Back et al., 2010; Evans, 
Gosling, & Carroll, 2008; Pennington & Hall, 2014; Qiu, Lin, Ramsay, & Yang, 2012; Rosenthal-Stott, Dicks, 
& Fielding, 2015; Westerman, Van Der Heide, Klein, & Walther, 2008). In contrast to deliberate profile 
evaluation, browsing involves skimming through separate bits of information without particular intentions to 
form impressions. Even if the encountered posts contain cues similar to those found in profiles, we do not know 
whether these cues will lead to inferences when people encounter them briefly and without the explicit goal to 
form impressions. 
Although the evidence for spontaneous inferences is substantial (Uleman et al., 2008), the setup of the 
experiments in which these inferences have been demonstrated differs from social media in important ways, 
which prevents us from generalizing their effects. The majority of studies on spontaneous trait inferences have 
used third-party descriptions (e.g., Rim, Uleman, & Trope, 2009; Saribay, Rim, & Uleman, 2012; Todd, 
Molden, Ham, & Vonk, 2011; Todorov & Uleman, 2002, 2003, 2004), which are particularly powerful in 
driving impressions (Walther, Van Der Heide, Kim, Westerman, & Tong, 2008). Moreover, the information in 
laboratory experiments can be of rather extreme nature. Behaviors such as "She threw a chair at her 
classmate"(Bliss-Moreau, Barrett, & Wright, 2008) or "I kicked [a puppy] out of my way" (Carlston & 
Skowronski, 1994; Carlston, Skowronski, & Sparks, 1995; McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011) can be found 
among the stimulus materials of experiments, but are something rarely seen on the average social media 
timeline. Another major difference lies in the number of posts people encounter in parallel. Nearly all 
experiments on spontaneous trait inferences present only one pair of actor and behavioral descriptions a time. 
Forming a distinct association under these conditions is fairly straightforward. On social media however, where 
many different actors and behaviors appear in parallel. 
Since updates on social media are self-generated and mild in content, it is not clear whether they will be 
sufficiently powerful as a cue to produce spontaneous inferences. Furthermore, viewing multiple updates in 
parallel and in "browse" mode might hinder the associative process. These crucial differences prevent us from 
knowing whether existing psychological research on spontaneous impression formation will generalize to the 
context of social media. The experiments presented here are part of a research line designed to address this 
outstanding question. 
Experiment 1A 
Method 
Sample size. The effect sizes in spontaneous trait inferences experiments, using the false recognition 
paradigm, are moderately large (e.g., dz = .98 in Todorov & Uleman, 2002, calculated based on t-value and 
sample size; Lakens 2013). A sample of 16 participants would be sufficient to achieve statistical power of .95 
for detecting such an effect size. Since there has been no prior research on the effect of self-generated 
behavioral descriptions, we have decided on larger sample sizes to ensure power of between .90 and .95 for 
detecting an effect size dz of between .61 and .68. 
Participants. Participants were recruited from the student participant pool of a German research 
institute. Since the stimulus material was presented as content similar to what can be seen on social media and 
networking sites, some experience with such sites (e.g., Twitter, Facebook) was required for participation. 
Forty-one participants took part in the study (35 female). 
False recognition procedure We followed the procedure of the false recognition paradigm (Todorov & 
Uleman, 2002). Participants saw status updates containing a picture and a short text, which they had to read 
carefully (learning phase). Each trial consisted of one update displayed for 10 seconds. A total of 36 status 
updates were presented. One-third of the updates included a personality trait. The remaining updates implied a 
trait without explicitly mentioning it. In the test phase, the same 36 actors were presented, each paired with a 
trait word. The 12 actors, whose original description included a trait, were paired with this presented trait. These 
trials served as fillers and not included in the analyses. The remaining actors were randomly split into three 
groups and paired with either: the trait implied in their original description (implied-trait condition); the trait 
implied by the description of another actor (other-trait condition); a novel trait (control condition). 
False recognition measure. During the test phase participants were asked to indicate as quickly as 
possible whether a word was "old" (i.e., presented in the update an actor originally posted) or "new". The 
correct response to all trials was "new" and responses "old" were coded as errors (false recognitions). False 
recognition rates were compared across conditions. Response times to correct trials were also recorded and 
compared across conditions. 
Direct assessment of impressions. In addition to the false recognition paradigm, participants were 
asked to evaluate some of the actors (n = 12 per participant) from the learning phase. On each trial they were 
shown a face, paired with two traits: the trait implied by the status update and another trait of the same valence. 
This assessment of impressions served as a direct measure of trait inference. 
Memory of stimuli. We measured memory for stimulus materials in a recall task. Participants saw six 
faces and were asked to type their corresponding updates. The responses were coded by a research assistant 
unaware of the design and hypotheses. The scale for accuracy was: 0 = no response, 1 = not at all accurate, 2 = 
accurate meaning; mistakes in wording, 3 = mostly accurate, 4 = accurate. We included an additional measure, 
checking whether participants recalled the content of updates, but paired them with the wrong targets. If a 
participant's response was a somewhat accurate recollection of one of the stimulus sentences but not that of the 
target face, the response was coded as mistaken target. 
Excluded cases. For each measure in the study, scores over three standard deviations above or below 
the sample mean were excluded as outliers. This decision was made prior to data collection. There were no 
outliers on te false recognition measure and one outlier on the response times measure. This person was 
excluded from all analyses. 
Additionally, we excluded five participants from analyses involving response times. Response times 
were computed for correct trials per condition. Four participants made no correct responses in the implied-trait 
condition; and one participant -- in the control condition. Since we could not compute response times, we 
excluded these participants from the analysis of response times (but not any of the other analyses). 
For the direct assessment of impressions, participants 1 to 17 had to be excluded from the analysis due 
to a technical error during the first day of data collection. Participants were originally instructed to use the left 
Alt and right Control key to submit their responses, but many reported becoming confused and using the right 
Control and left Alt instead. The answer keys were then recoded to 'X' and 'M', which resolved the issue. The 
difference in allowed responses is also visible in the raw data, which is available upon request. 
Results 
Participants made considerably more mistakes when an actor's face was paired with the trait implied for 
this actor (implied-trait condition; M = 0.52, SD = 0.31), as compared to a trait implied for another actor (other-
trait condition; M = 0.22, SD = 0.21) or a novel trait (control condition; M = 0.21, SD = 0.25). There was no 
significant difference between the other-trait and control conditions. 
 
Table 1. 
Results of dependent-samples t-tests comparing false recognition rates across conditions. 
Difference df t p (two-tailed) Hedges' g [95% CI] 
implied-other 39 5.25 < 0.001 1.12 [0.64;1.63] 
implied-control 39 5.23 < 0.001 1.09 [0.62;1.59] 
other-control 39 0.5 0.621 0.07 [-0.2;0.33] 
 
Average response times to correct trials ranged between 0.9 and 6.3 seconds (M = 2.58, Mdn = 2.33, SD 
= 1.15). The data violated assumptions of normality. We performed a log10 transformation on the row data 
(RTs per trial). To avoid negative values, we added 1.0 to all values prior to the transformation. Following the 
transformation, the data no longer violated the assumptions of normality and equal variances (Shapiro Wilk's ps 
> 0.01; Levene's test ps > 0.28). Response times to correct trials were longer than response times to control 
trials (Table 2). These differences are in line with the idea that providing a correct response was more difficult 
for implied traits. 
 
Table 2.  
Results of dependent-samples t-tests comparing RT to correct trials across conditions. 
Difference df t p (two-tailed) Hedges' g [95% CI] 
implied-other:same trial 33 2.77 0.009 0.26 [0.07;0.47] 
implied-control:other trial 33 2.83 0.008 0.27 [0.07;0.47] 
other:same trial-control:other trial 33 0.39 0.697 0.03 [-0.12;0.18] 
Note. Reported means are back-transformed. 
 
More than half of the respones were either entirely absent (47%) or inaccurate (14%). However, there 
were also many cases of accurate recalled status updates (38%). This indicates that participants had memorized 
some of the updates. 
The occurrence of spontaneous inferences was also apparent when participants were asked to evaluate 
the actors from the learning task. Participants selected the trait implied about the an actor over a trait implied by 
another actor NaN% of the time, which was significantly higher than chance (95%CI [0,1], p = 1). 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment show that the content typically encountered on social media - brief, self-
generated, and mild - can result in spontaneous trait inferences. Trait inferences were evident in the number of 
mistakes participants made: They were more likely to falsely recognize a trait as having been previously 
presented in an actor's status update when the trait was implied by the status update. In a separate task, when 
asked to evaluate an actor, participants were more likely to select the trait implied by the actor's status update 
versus another trait of similar valence. However, our memory measure revealed that in nearly half of time, 
participants were able to recall the content of an actor's status update, which prevents us from knowing whether 
the results of the latter, direct evaluation measure, were driven by trait inference or by stimulus recall. To 
reduce the rate of memorization in the actual experiment, we reduced the presentation time from 10 to 5 
seconds per trial. 
In the present experiment, we showed only one update at a time and the possibility remains that if 
information about different actors is presented at once, there will not be clear associations and person-specific 
inferences. The following experiment was designed to test address this concern. Although our main aim was to 
test whether the effect occurs with a larger number of stimuli, we began by showing 2 updates at a time. The 
experiment was thus similar to the experiments conducted by Todorov and Uleman (2004). 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants and procedure. 
Thirty-four participants took part in the study. The procedure, stimuli, and measures were similar to 
those in Experiment 1, with the exception of how we presented the stimuli. Instead of seeing one status update 
at a time, participants saw two updates in parallel. There were 16 trials, each consisting of two status updates. 
Apart from the implied-trait condition, there were two comparison conditions: other (same trial), where faces 
were presented with the trait implied by the other status update in the same trial and control (other trial), with 
traits of status updates from other trials. 
The free recall tasked was scored as described in Experiment 1A. Inter-coder reliability was estimated 
on 20% of the responses, for which ratings were obtained from two independent coders. There was high 
consistency (ICC_accuracy = 0.93, 95%CI [0.83,0.97], ICC_mixed = 0.68, 95%CI [0.37,0.86]). 
Results 
Participants made considerably more mistakes when an actor's face was paired with the trait implied for 
this actor (implied-trait condition; M = 0.53, SD = 0.21) as compared to a trait implied for another actor from 
the same trial (M = 0.31, SD = 0.2) or from another trial (M = 0.32, SD = 0.19). There was no significant 
difference between the two control conditions. 
 
Table 3. 
Results of dependent-samples t-tests comparing false recognition rates across conditions. 
Difference df t p (two-tailed) Hedges' g [95% CI] 
same-other 34 6.26 < 0.001 1.03 [0.64;1.47] 
same-control 34 5.45 < 0.001 0.99 [0.57;1.45] 
other-control 34 -0.4 0.692 -0.05 [-0.32;0.21] 
 
Average response times to correct trials ranged between 1.09 and 4.18 seconds (M = 2.25, Mdn = 2.1, 
SD = 0.75). The data violated assumptions of normality. We performed a log10 transformation on the row data 
(RTs per trial). To avoid negative values, we added 1.0 to all values prior to the transformation. Following the 
transformation, the data no longer violated the assumptions of normality and equal variances (Shapiro Wilk's 
_p_s > 0.5; Levene's test ps > 0.11). One participant made no correct responses in the other trait, same trial 
condition. Response times to correct trials could not be computed and we excluded participants in order to keep 
a balanced design. There were no significant differences between conditions (all ps > 0.294). 
 
Table 4. 
Results of dependent-samples t-tests comparing RT to correct trials across conditions. 
Difference df t p (two-tailed) Hedges' g [95% CI] 
same-other 33 0.73 0.468 0.11 [-0.19;0.41] 
same-control 33 1.07 0.294 0.17 [-0.15;0.5] 
other-control 33 0.52 0.605 0.07 [-0.2;0.35] 
 
As in Study 1, recall of the status-update sentences was low. On the majority of trials, participants 
provided no response (40%) or a highly inaccurate response (32%). There were some cases where a sentence 
from the stimulus set was recalled but reported for the wrong target person (19%), which shows that participants 
recalled more than their raw memory scores suggest. Nevertheless, the overall recall was sufficiently low. 
Despite having poor recall of the seen updates, when asked to evaluate an actor, participants chose the 
implied trait another trait of the same valence 74% of the time, which was significantly higher than chance 
(95%CI [0.68,0.8], p < .0001). This result is consistent with our hypotheses and the pattern observed in 
Experiment 1. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 provided evidence that the simultaneous presentation of status updates can result in 
distinct, actor-specific inferences. Participants were more likely to falsely recognize an implied trait as having 
been previously presented, which indicated that they spontaneously inferred the trait. They were also more 
likely to associate an actor with the trait implied by this actor's update, without necessarily being able to recall 
the update. We did not find the expected differences in response times. Although the differences reached the 
conventional levels of significance, they were small, opposite of what was expected, and inconsistent with the 
results of the prior experiment where no effects were found. 
Unique to this experiment is the demonstration that when participants viewed updates simultaneously, 
the traits they inferred from each update were distinctly associated with the author of the update and not with 
the other person whose picture and update they viewed at the same time. However, the experimental setup does 
not rule out the possibility that browsing poses a boundary condition to this association. We therefore conducted 
a third experiment, in which participants browsed through the updates at their own pace in a setup that closely 
resembled social media. 
General discussion 
For the general discussion of the research, please refer to the publication. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations. 
 Means SD 2 3 
Experiment 1A     
1. False recognitions 0.32 0.18 0.16 -0.36* 
2. Respone times 2.64 1.17  0.37 
3. Memory 1.82 0.72   
Experiment 2A     
1. False recognitions 0.39 0.17 -0.06 0.35 
2. Respone times 2.23 0.67  0.31 
3. Memory 1.12 0.46   
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Abstract 
Being able to recognize the expertise of others (who knows what) is essential for knowledge 
exchange. A prominent idea among media and organization scholars is that browsing social 
media fosters such awareness, because people spontaneously register various cues to others‟ 
interests and expertise they encounter online (ambient awareness). However, the central idea that 
ambient awareness develops without effort or intention has never been tested. In the tradition of 
spontaneous inferences research, we examined whether inferences of domain expertise are 
indeed spontaneous. In two experiments, participants inferred actors‟ implied expertise after 
reading (Experiment 1; N = 91) or skimming through (Experiment 2; N = 269) domain-implying 
social media posts. Domain inferences under low attentiveness (skimming) were moderated by 
number of cues and participants‟ own interests. By extending psychological research on 
spontaneous inferences to domain expertise, we provide a foundation for research into ambient 
awareness and the informational benefits of social media. 
 Keywords: Social Perception, Social Cognition, Human-computer interaction, Human 
Information Storage, Organizations 
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Ambient awareness of who knows what: Spontaneous inferences of domain expertise 
Ambient awareness refers to the idea that people can get to know who is who and who 
knows what in their online social networks by regularly skimming social media updates, without 
having to pay particular attention or exert any exceptional effort (Leonardi, 2015; Levordashka 
& Utz, 2016a; Thompson, 2008). The concept has received substantial attention in the 
communication and organization literature because awareness of who knows what is 
fundamental to successful information exchange processes (Austin, 2003; Wegner, 1987). 
However, this awareness is not that easy to achieve in mediated communication (Fulk & Yuan, 
2013; Leonardi, 2015; Leonardi & Meyer, 2015). Social media have been praised highly for their 
potential to help people profit from the large, diverse, and geographically dispersed networks 
that digital technologies make possible (Chui et al., 2012; Donath, 2007). First studies show 
associations between social media use and informational benefits (Leonardi & Meyer, 2015; Utz, 
2015) and ambient awareness has been at the forefront of theories as to how these benefits come 
about. However, the central idea of ambient awareness that information about who knows what 
is inferred spontaneously, without effort or deliberation, has not been tested. This proposition is 
crucial, because given the size and complexity of social networks and the sheer amount of 
information on social media, a deliberate process would be far less potent and efficient than this 
spontaneous process. Conceptual support comes from psychological research on snap person 
judgments and spontaneous inferences (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992; Uleman, Adil Saribay, & 
Gonzalez, 2008), but there is no evidence that these phenomena extend to information about 
domains of expertise (who knows what). In the research presented here, we tested whether 
awareness of others' domains of expertise can develop spontaneously, that is, without deliberate 
intention and effort, in the course of browsing social media. By extending psychological research 
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on spontaneous inferences to domain expertise in the context of social media, we seek to provide 
a foundation for research into the informational benefits of social media. 
Social media is a broad term used to describe communication technologies which allow 
users to create and disseminate content publicly or to a specified group (network, community). 
This includes popular services like Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn, but also company-internal 
enterprise software. Social media enable lightweight communication, such as declaring and 
displaying social relationships (e.g., "following", "friending"), broadcasting content to wide 
audiences, easily commenting on, re-sharing, and reacting to others' content. Using social media 
results in a development of awareness (Rice et al., 2017; Treem & Leonardi, 2012)/ While 
awareness is already considered to be one of the affordances of social media (Rice et al., 2017), 
less is known about the process through which it develops. Information on social media is 
typically brief, momentary, and delivered to users in real time, resulting in a stream of 
disconnected updates from different people. As a result, single pieces of information are not 
particularly informative and rarely given more than a passing glance. Therefore awareness via 
social media stems from the accumulation of fragmented personal information (Hampton, Lee, & 
Her, 2011; Leonardi, 2015; Levordashka & Utz, 2016a). 
Theoretical support for the idea of ambient awareness comes from psychological research 
on spontaneous inferences from brief instances of behavior (Uleman et al., 2008). This shows 
that people spontaneously extract potentially valuable information, even in conditions of 
superficial processing and under high cognitive or information load. Research has found this to 
be the case for different kinds of information, including traits, values, and, more recently, social 
roles (Chen, Banerji, Moons, & Sherman, 2014). The explanations behind spontaneous 
inferences in psychology revolve around the idea that some information is inherently and 
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fundamentally valuable (Moskowitz & Olcaysoy Okten, 2016; Uleman et al., 2008). For 
example, knowing others' traits and goals helps people judge whether they would attack or 
protect them, which is likely not the case when it comes to knowing whether someone is a 
programmer or a photographer. Implicated in ambient awareness, however, are exactly such 
inferences of domains of knowledge, which have never been demonstrated and can be considered 
unlikely. It is important to note that we consider domains of expertise (e.g., who is a 
programmer) rather than degree of competence (e.g., who is the better programmer). 
Moreover, while conceptually related, spontaneous trait inferences from behavior differ 
from inferences via social media in important ways that prevent direct generalization. Recent 
work has shown that the effect generalizes to some extent but has also highlighted some 
limitations (Levordashka & Utz, 2016b). Namely, while evidence for spontaneous inferences 
was found for multiple stimuli presented at once, the effect was less pronounced when people 
browsed a timeline at their own pace (as opposed to seeing the posts for a fixed amount of time). 
Existing work on the topic is therefore not sufficient to ensure that awareness via social media 
can develop spontaneously. 
Evidence for ambient awareness and its potential role in information exchange comes 
from a number of recent studies. Leonardi (2015) found that after using social media, employees 
had better awareness of who knows what in their department. The participants reported both the 
frequency with which they "happened to notice" versus "spent time carefully reading" 
information about others. It was the process of "happening to notice" that better predicted 
subsequent awareness. Another study found that people were more satisfied with knowledge 
transfer, if they used social media to find out more about their communication partners before 
actually approaching them (Leonardi, 2015). Surveys revealed that browsing was related to self-
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reported familiarity with the hobbies and profession of people known only through social media 
(Levordashka & Utz, 2016a). 
These studies highlight the importance of ambient awareness but fail to provide any 
convincing test of the major premise that awareness arises without deliberate effort or intention. 
Surveys measure user activity and correlate it to perceived levels of awareness. However, they 
are not able to validate the accuracy of people's perceptions. Studies done within organizations 
could validate the accuracy of awareness, but could not rule out the influence of prior 
acquaintanceship, face-to-face interactions, and motivation, since they were conducted in a 
workplace context where people interact frequently and topics related to expertise are 
particularly salient. 
In the research presented here, we seek to answer the question: Can awareness of domain 
expertise (who knows what) develop spontaneously and efficiently in the course of browsing. In 
two experiments, participants (observers) browsed social media posts, some of which contained 
cues to the expertise of the people who ostensibly posted them (actors). We used two measures 
to assess whether the observers inferred the actors' expertise from the posts. There was no 
mention of expertise inference or impression formation in the instructions, therefore the 
inferences observers made could be considered spontaneous. 
In the first experiment, we focused on the type of information and mode of presentation. 
As we previously outlined, there has been no prior research evidence that people spontaneously 
infer domains of expertise in the same way they infer traits, values, or goals. We adapted an 
existing trait-inference paradigm (Todorov & Uleman, 2002) using domain-implying cues (e.g., 
"Front-end developer aka JavaScript wizard also HTML5/CSS3. Hire me!" suggesting 
knowledge in the domain of programming). In addition, since prior work on trait inferences in 
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social media suggested that trait inferences are weaker when people browsed a timeline, we 
compared inferences under different modes of presentation: self-paced viewing of a single 
stimulus pair versus browsing all stimuli on a timeline. We hypothesized that participants would 
infer information about actors' domains of expertise after reading a short social media update and 
without being instructed to do so (H1), and that this effect might be weaker or absent when 
people browse on a timeline (H2). 
In the second experiment, we used instructions that further diminished attentiveness. We 
anticipated that in conditions that caused low attentiveness, participants would be less likely to 
notice individual posts. We therefore included actors with multiple posts that implied the same 
domain. Our hypotheses were that domain inferences would occur under low attentiveness (H3), 
but the effect might weaker or absent for actors with single cues (H4). We also explored the 
possibility that observers might attend to actors' domains to a greater extent if they were 
additionally motivated to do so. We therefore manipulated the expectation of an upcoming 
domain-related task and tested whether this resulted in stronger inferences (H5). Hypotheses 4 
and 5 address potential moderating factors, which, if supported would speak against the 
spontaneity and efficiency of the process. 
We additionally examined whether exposure to different types of posts would influence 
the observers' impressions of the actors' approachability and competence. Although not directly 
linked to domain inferences, impressions play an important role in information exchange. Based 
on the mere exposure literature (Bornstein, 1989), we hypothesized that participants would be 
more likely to judge people seen multiple times as more approachable than people seen only 
once (H6). In both experiments we investigated the potential role of other factors, including the 
participants' own domains of interest and their self-reported interest in the posts. 
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General method 
We collected data online and convenience samples recruited through the participant pool 
Prolific. The experiments took up to 15 minutes to complete, and each participant received 1.3 
GBP in payment. Participants were informed about the procedure, potential risks, and benefits 
but not the exact purpose of the study. Instead, they were told that the study was about "how 
people process the information they see in social media". At the end of the study they were 
debriefed and provided with the opportunity to withdraw their data using an anonymous I.D. 
Sample size was planned to ensure a power of at least 80% to detect a small to medium effect 
(Cohen's d = .40). The effect size estimate was based on prior studies using similar design 
(Todorov & Uleman, 2002; Levordashka & Utz, 2016). 
The experiments were preregistered. We report all data exclusions, manipulations, and 
measures. The pre-registration materials, data, and analysis scripts are available at: 
https://osf.io/mfb4z/?view_only=b1eed1bea0ba4fe3a486eb0967ab5184 [Anonymized link]. 
Procedure 
Learning phase. In the learning phase, participants saw actors paired with cues that 
implied certain domains of expertise without mentioning them explicitly (e.g., "Front-end 
developer aka JavaScript wizard also HTML5/CSS3, and PHP. Hire me!" suggesting knowledge 
in the domain of programming). Participants were only instructed to read or browse, there was 
no mention of impression formation. The exact instructions varied between experiments and are 
reported in the individual methods sections. The learning phase was always self-paced, that is, 
participants decided how much time they wanted to spend reading the posts. 
Stimuli. The complete list of domains and domain-implying sentences can be seen in 
Supplementary Materials Table S1. We selected 10 domains (Teaching, Design, Management, 
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Programming, Biology, Architecture, Photography, Advertising, Psychology, Finance) with the 
general criteria that they were not too specific or obscure and reasonably distinctive. Research 
assistants collected and rephrased social media posts that implied or mentioned each of the 
domains. There were 5 posts per domain. Posts that did not imply a domain were considered 
"neutral". We had a pool of 20 neutral posts. We selected 40 faces (50% female) of similar 
attractiveness, competence, and memorability from the Bainbridge, Isola, & Oliva (2013) 
database (ratings are included in the database). The stimuli were presented in the form of social 
media posts, containing a face (the post's author) and a sentence (the post's content). To avoid 
potential confounds related to participants' stereotypes of certain domains, we did not use a fixed 
set of stimuli but instead used an algorithm to generate a novel set of stimuli on each run. In this 
way, each participant saw a particular domain with a different combination of face, name, and 
sentence. We recorded information for each cue, including actor's gender and the domain implied 
by their social media post. 
Probe recognition task. After seeing all of the posts, the participants completed a 
forced-choice probe recognition task, adapted by Todorov and Uleman (2002), which assesses 
inferences indirectly. Participants saw each actor from the learning phase, paired with a word, 
and had to indicate whether this word was mentioned in the sentence they had previously seen 
with the actor. Each actor whose cue implied a domain was presented twice: Once with the 
domain word implied by the cue (same/match) and once with the domain-word implied for 
another actor (other/mismatch). In addition, all of the actors whose posts did not imply any 
domain (neutral) were presented with a word that had been part of the sentence from the learning 
phase. 
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False recognition measure. In each trial of the probe recognition task, participants 
indicated whether the word presented next to an actor's face was present in the sentence they had 
previously seen with the actor ('old') or whether it was a new word ('new'). All actors for which a 
domain had been implied were presented with a word that had not appeared in the sentence, 
therefore responses 'old' were always incorrect (false recognition). Prior studies have consistently 
shown that after seeing a number of actor-cue pairs, people were more likely to falsely recognize 
implied information as having been previously presented, when this information is paired with 
the actor whose cue implied it (same/match), as compared to another actor (other/mismatch). 
Therefore, a pattern where more mistakes were made on matched versus mismatched trials 
indicated that participants made actor-specific inferences. 
Domain identification task. The false recognition task was followed by a direct 
assessment of domain identification, where participants had to identify each actor‟s domain of 
expertise from a list of 9 domains, with an option to skip the question (non-response). Domain 
identification was considered correct when the response participants provided in the domain 
recognition measure matched the one implied by the actor's cue in the learning phase. Separately, 
we coded whether participants selected 'skip' rather providing an answer (non-response). 
Additional measures. At the end of the study, participants identified their own domains 
of interest/expertise from a list of all domains included in the study, reported how frequently they 
use social media, and estimated their level of attentiveness throughout the study (ranging from 0 
= "answered all questions carefully" to 4 = "responses were mostly random"). We recorded the 
time they spent reading posts in the learning phase, as well as their total study duration. 
Demographic information, including gender, age, and employment status was retrieved from the 
participant recruitment platform. 
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Randomization. Within each block (task), trials were randomized on each run (i.e., 
different order for each participant). The only exception was the follow-up questions, which 
always appeared in the same order. 
Exclusion criteria. Participants who reported low attentiveness ("responses were mostly 
random") were excluded. For each experiment, we conducted pretests to estimate the shortest 
completion time that could be considered meaningful. A research assistant was instructed to 
complete the study as quickly as possible, skimming through questions but not entirely skipping 
them. Since in the learning phase participants were instructed to read the posts at their own pace, 
we subtracted the duration of this phase and excluded participants based only on the time they 
spent on the remaining phases. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
The experiment had a mixed-design with one between-subjects condition (presentation: 
single post per page vs. all posts on a timeline), a repeated-measures task with within-subject 
manipulation (false recognition paradigm; probe type: same domain vs. other domain), and a 
one-sample accuracy task (domain identification). The experiment was preregistered. All data 
and materials are publicly available. We collected responses from 110 participants. 
Excluded cases. Based on our pretest, the shortest meaningful completion time 
(excluding the learning phase) was 1.75 minutes. As planned, we excluded participants whose 
study duration was under this threshold (n = 14). Two additional participants were excluded for 
reporting low attentiveness ("responses were mostly random"). These exclusion criteria were 
planned and preregistered. In addition, due to unforeseen errors in the experimental code, certain 
trials in the probe recognition task were not displayed and resulted in missing data. The missing 
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trials occurred at random. This error affected 23 participants. For our dependent measure, each 
participant responded to 9 trials, which were then aggregated to a mean score. From the 
participants affected by the error, we retained data from those who had responded to at least 
three trials (n = 20). We analyzed data from 91 participants. 
Stimuli and manipulations. Each participant saw a unique set of 9 domain-implying and 
9 domain-neutral posts in random order. Participants were randomly assigned to either viewing 
one post at a time (n = 48) or all posts on a timeline (n = 43). 
Results 
Sample descriptives. Demographic information was retrieved separately from the 
Prolific participant pool. The sample consisted of 25 females and 59 males (gender information 
for 7 participants was missing). The mean age was 28 (SD = 8; 7 missing). Roughtly half of the 
participants were employed full time (48%) and another 30% were employed part-time or were 
unemployed and seeking. 
One participant took 58.6 minutes to complete the study. The remaining responses ranged 
from 3.4 to 20.6 minutes (Median = 7.5, Mean = 8.6, SD = 4.1). On average, participants took 
(SD = 1.1; Median = 1.5) minutes to read the 18 posts.  
False recognitions. The data were analyzed and plotted in R (R Core Team, 2016; 
Wickham, 2009). The analysis of false recognition was performed only on domain-related trials 
(responses to actors whose posts contained domain cues). Neutral trials served as fillers and were 
removed. The trials within each within-subject condition were aggregated to a mean score. This 
is an established analysis strategy is commonly adopted with the false-recognition paradigm 
(e.g., Todorov & Uleman, 2002; Chen et al., 2016). We used linear mixed models fit by 
maximum likelihood (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Model summaries in Table 1.  
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First, to determine the effect of probe type (same versus other) we compared an intercept 
only model (M1) with a model including probe type (M2) and a model with interaction between 
probe type and presentation (M3). The only significant improvement from the intercept-only 
model (M1) was adding probe type (M2), χ2 = 17.67, p < .0001 (all other p s > 0.506). The main 
effect of probe type was such that participants made more mistakes on same-domain (M = 0.52, 
SD = 0.22) versus other-domain trials (M = 0.39, SD = 0.23; Hedges' g = 0.4 95%CI [0.11,0.7], p 
< .0001), regardless of presentation. That is, participants were likely to think that they had seen a 
certain domain-related word in a sentence that had merely implied it, from which we conclude 
they spontaneously inferred the actors' implied domains of expertise (H1). 
Table 1  
 
Model summaries for effects of probe type and presentation  
on false recognition rates 
 
DV: False recognitions 
 
M1 M2 M3 
PT 
 
-0.13*** -0.16*** 
  
(-0.18, -0.07) (-0.24, -0.08) 
PRES 
  
-0.04 
   
(-0.13, 0.05) 
PT * PRES 
  
0.07 
   
(-0.05, 0.18) 
Constant 0.45*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 
 
(0.42, 0.49) (0.47, 0.56) (0.47, 0.60) 
Observations 182 182 182 
Log Likelihood 6.54 15.37 16.05 
Akaike Inf. Crit. -7.07 -22.75 -20.11 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 2.54 -9.93 -0.88 
Note: **p < .05, ***p < .01. PT=Probe type, PRES=Presentation. 
 
Originally, we had planned to analyze the study using a repeated-measures ANOVA, but 
changed the analysis strategy due to the unbalanced group sizes (there were 5 more participants 
in the single-post condition). To ensure that the initial analysis plan yields similar results, we 
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performed two repeated-measures ANOVA: one after excluding the last 5 responses in the 
single-post condition and one after excluding the first 5 (Table S3 in the supplementary 
material). The results of both analyses corresponded to what we had found in the mixed models: 
main effect of probe type (ps < .001; all other ps > .182). 
Domain identification. On average, people skipped items 22% of the time. They did so 
significantly less often for actors whose posts contained domain cues (16%), versus actors whose 
posts were neutral (27%), χ2 (1, N = 1412) = 27.11, p < .0001. 
Since participants were asked to select from 10 options (9 domains and "skip"), we 
considered the probability of correctly guessing the implied domain to be 10%. Results are 
displayed in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Accuracy of domain identification as a function of presentation. Horizontal line 
represents chance-level accuracy. 
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We used exact binomial tests to compare the observed number of correct responses to 
what could be expected by chance. In both conditions, participants' responses were significantly 
higher than chance at recognizing the domains implied by actors' posts (single post condition: 
30% of successful recognition, 95%CI [0.25,0.34], p < .0001; timeline condition: 33% of 
successful recognition, 95%CI [0.28,0.38], p < .0001). There was no significant difference in 
domain identification accuracy between the two presentation conditions, t(78) = -0.703, p = 0.48. 
Thus, the instances of correctly identifying an actor's domain of expertise were higher than 
chance regardless of presentation. In line with our other dependent variable, this suggests that the 
observers formed impressions of the actors' expertise without having been instructed to do so 
(H1), regardless of how the posts were presented (H2). 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we examined the effect under lower levels of attentiveness (i.e., 
skimming). Furthermore, we explore the role of factors such as observers' own domains of 
interest, which might become increasingly relevant under low attentiveness. 
Method 
The procedure and primary measures are as described in the general method. Participants 
were instructed to "browse through the posts" rather than "carefully read" the posts. We 
introduced two factors: number of cues per actor (within-subjects) and implied goal (between-
subjects) and measured participants' impressions of the targets in a forced-choice task. The 
experiment had a 2 between (implied goal; no goal) by 2 within (single versus multiple domain 
cues) mixed-design. 
We had planned to collect data from 200 participants in order to ensure 95% power for 
detecting a small effect size (Cohen's d = .40) for a main effect of probe type and a 80% power 
SPONTANEOUS INFERENCES OF DOMAIN EXPERTISE 16 
 
of detecting a significant interaction between probe type and number of cues in each between-
subject condition. After reaching the planned sample of participants, we became aware that due 
to an error in the randomization procedure, all of the participants had been assigned to the no-
goal condition. In the same interval of time on the following day, we collected additional 
responses, all of which were in the remaining implied-goal condition. Therefore, the assignment 
to the between-subjects condition was not random. Our final sample consisted of 304 responses 
(195 in the no-goal and 109 in implied-goal condition). 
Excluded cases. As described in the general method, we conducted pretests to estimate 
the shortest meaningful completion time that could be considered meaningful. The time it took to 
complete all of the tasks, excluding the learning phase, was 1.8 minutes. As planned, we 
excluded participants whose study duration (excluding the learning phase) was under this 
threshold (n = 23). On the self-reported measure of attention, 11 participants reported low 
attention ("Your responses were mostly random") and were excluded. One person appeared to 
have completed the study twice and we excluded their second set of responses. In total, we 
excluded 35 respondents and analyzed data from 269 participants (174 in the no-goal and 95 in 
implied-goal condition). 
Another potential exclusion criterion was a manipulation check, where participants were 
asked to identify the instructions they had received at the beginning of the study. Only 48% of 
the respondents were able to do that successfully. As specified in the preregistration, in this case 
we did not use the manipulation check as an exclusion criterion but as a factor in a set of 
exploratory analyses. 
Stimuli and manipulations. Each participant saw a unique set of 40 posts from 16 
different actors in random order. The posts of 8 actors implied expertise domains. Half of these 8 
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actors had four different posts, each implying the same domain (multiple-cues condition) and 
four had a single post (single-cue condition). The remaining 8 actors had domain-neutral posts. 
Again, half of these had four posts and half had a single post. All participants received the 
following instructions: "You are about to see a number of social media posts. Browse through 
the posts at your own pace and mark the ones you consider interesting using the corresponding 
Like (thumbs-up) buttons." For participants in the implied-goal condition (n = 109) this was 
followed by the sentence: "Afterwards you will work on a task that involves selecting experts 
who could provide a second opinion on a series of topics. Specific instructions will follow." At 
the end of the study, we included a manipulation check, in which we asked the participants to 
identify the instructions they had received, among 4 similar sounding instructions. 
Impressions measure. We measured participants' impressions of the actors' 
approachability and competence with a series of forced-choice trials. On each trial participants 
saw two faces and had to choose the face they consider more approachable or competent, 
respectively. We compared the following groups: a) one neutral versus multiple neutral cues; b) 
one domain versus multiple domain cues; c) multiple neutral versus multiple dominant cues. For 
each two groups, each of the 4 actors in one group was paired with one of the 4 actors in the 
other group. All pairs were of the same gender. This resulted in 12 trials per judgment block 
(approachable, competent), randomized within the block. Definitions of approachability and 
competence were provided before the respective blocks were presented. 
Results 
Sample descriptives. The remaining sample consisted of 176 females and 18 males (21 
missing), with a mean age of 28 (SD = 10). On average, participants took 10.7 (SD = 4.9), 
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minutes to complete the study and 2.9 (SD = 4.9) minutes to read all posts. Most participants 
were employed full-time (53%), part-time (21%) or were unemployed and seeking a job (12%). 
False recognitions. As in Experiment 1, neutral-cue (i.e., filler) trials were removed, the 
four domain-cue trials within each within-subject condition were aggregated to a mean score, 
and we used linear mixed models with random intercepts for participants (Table 2) 
Table 2  
 
Model summaries for effects of probe type, number of cues,  
and implied goal on false recognition rates 
 
DV: False recognitions 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
PT 
 
-0.14*** -0.04* -0.14*** -0.05* 
  
(-0.17, -0.11) (-0.09, 0.002) (-0.18, -0.10) (-0.10, 0.01) 
NC 
  
0.18*** 
 
0.16*** 
   
(0.13, 0.22) 
 
(0.10, 0.21) 
PT * NC 
  
-0.19*** 
  
   
(-0.25, -0.13) 
  
IG 
   
0.01 -0.02 
    
(-0.05, 0.06) (-0.09, 0.05) 
NC * IG 
    
-0.18*** 
     
(-0.26, -0.10) 
PT * IG 
    
0.05 
     
(-0.04, 0.14) 
PT * NC * IG 
   
0.01 0.02 
    
(-0.06, 0.07) (-0.07, 0.11) 
Constant 
    
-0.03 
     
(-0.16, 0.10) 
Constant 0.49*** 0.56*** 0.47*** 0.56*** 0.48*** 
 
(0.47, 0.51) (0.54, 0.59) (0.44, 0.51) (0.53, 0.59) (0.44, 0.52) 
Observations 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 
Log Likelihood -205.61 -172.21 -142.50 -172.08 -141.63 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 417.23 352.42 297.00 356.15 303.26 
Note: p < .05, ***p < .01. PT=Probe type, NC=Number of cues, IG=Implied goal. 
 
 To determine the effect of probe type (same versus other) we compared an intercept-only 
model (M1) with a model including probe type (M2). Including probe type significantly 
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improved the model fit (χ2 = 66.8, p < .0001), indicating significant main effect of probe type, 
which indicates that the participants inferred actors' domains of expertise (H3). 
To test the effect of number of cues, we compared the probe-type-only model (M2) to a 
model including the interaction between probe type and number of cues (M3). The interaction 
improved the model fit substantially (χ2 = 59.42, p < .0001). The interaction qualified the effect 
of probe type, indicating that trait inferences occurred only for actors of whom the participants 
had seen multiple posts (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Interaction between probe type and number of cues 
For actors with multiple-domain cues, participants made more mistakes on trials where 
actors were presented with the domain implied by their posts (same; M = 0.65, SD = 0.29), as 
compared to trials on which actor were presented with other domains (other; M = 0.42, SD = 
0.28; Hedges' g = 0.52 [0.35,0.69]). For actors with single-domain cues, participants made 
similar number of mistakes regardless of probe (same: M = 0.47, SD = 0.28; other: M = 0.43, SD 
SPONTANEOUS INFERENCES OF DOMAIN EXPERTISE 20 
 
= 0.27; Hedges' g = 0.11 [-0.06,0.28]). Thus trait inferences only occurred for actors who had 
multiple domain cues (H4). 
A model with implicit goal and probe type interaction (M4) did not improve model fit 
over probe type (χ2 = 1.75, p = 0.782), indicating that implicit goal had no effect on trait 
inferences (H5). We additionally looked at whether the three-way interaction model (M5) had 
better fit than our best model (M3), and it did not (p = 0.782). 
Domain identification. On average, people skipped items 25% of the time. They did so 
significantly less often for actors whose posts contained domain cues (21%) versus actors whose 
posts were neutral (30%), χ2 (1, N = 1412) = 37.98, p < .0001. The analysis of domain 
identification was analogous to that of false recognition (Model summaries in Table 3). The 
number of cues improved the model fit over an intercept-only model (χ2 = 62.96 , p < .0001) 
whereas implied goal did not (χ2 = 0.06 , p = 0.806).  
Table 3  
 
Model summaries for effects of number of cues and  
implied goal on domain identification accuracy 
 
DV: Domain Identification 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 
NC 
 
0.16*** 
 
0.16*** 
  
(0.13, 0.20) 
 
(0.11, 0.21) 
IG   0.01 0.0000 
   (-0.05, 0.06) (-0.07, 0.07) 
NC * IG 
   
0.01 
    
(-0.07, 0.09) 
Constant 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.24*** 
 
(0.30, 0.35) (0.21, 0.27) (0.29, 0.35) (0.20, 0.28) 
Observations 538 538 538 538 
Log Likelihood -81.75 -50.27 -81.72 -50.18 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 169.49 108.53 171.43 112.36 
Note: **p < .05, ***p < .01. NC=Number of cues, IG=Implied goal. 
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Figure 3. Accuracy of domain identification as a function of number of domain cues. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, participants were significantly better than chance at 
recognizing the domains of actors with a single cue (24% of successful identification, 95%CI 
[0.21,0.27], p < .0001) and better yet for actors with multiple cues (40% of successful 
identification (95%CI [0.37,0.43]), p < .0001). 
As with the first dependent variable, we saw that when participants were merely 
instructed to browse through a timeline of social media posts, they spontaneously inferred actors' 
domains of expertise from their posts (H3), but only for actors who had multiple expertise-
implying posts (H4). 
Informing participants about an upcoming expertise-related task, which could be 
expected to make expertise more salient and/or set an implicit goal to monitor expertise (H5), did 
not seem to affect the extent to which participants made inferences. An important conclusion 
here was that domain inferences to occurred even when there when there was no particular 
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salience of expertise (H3). It is not entirely clear why the implicit goal had no effect. One 
explanation would be that inferences were made regardless of topic salience. This would be in 
line with the idea of spontaneity. However, since many participants failed the manipulation 
check, an alternative explanation could be that the manipulation was unsuccessful. In attempt to 
rule out this explanation, we did a set of exploratory analyses, where we repeated our primary 
analyses on a subset of participants who passed the manipulation check. Again, the implied goal 
factor did not improve model fit over number of cues (χ2 = 111.32 , p < .0001). That is, the 
results were analogous to the initial analyses, which suggests that the first explanation offered 
above, that our manipulation was not successful, is unlikely. 
Impressions. We used forced-choice trials to compare whether our manipulations of 
domain expertise (neutral vs. domain related posts) and exposure (number of cues) influenced 
participants impressions of the actors' approachability and competence. On each trial participants 
were asked to make a choice between two faces belonging to different groups. This resulted in 
four trials per comparison. We considered all trials and ran binomial tests to determine whether 
one of the two groups in each comparison was chosen more often.  
Results can be seen in Figure 4. As predicted, actors with domain-implied posts who 
were seen more often (with multiple neutral cues) were more likely to be chosen as 
approachable, compared to actors who were seen once (single neutral cue; p = 0.0006). This was 
also the case for domain cues (p = 0.0004). The effect of exposure was independent of post type: 
Actors with multiple neutral and domain-related cues were chosen equally often (p = 0.8789). 
This pattern is in line with the idea of a mere exposure effect. 
With regard to competence, multiple exposure did not influence judgments when the cues 
were domain-irrelevant (p = 0.1899). Exposure to domain-related cues did influence judgments. 
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Participants were more likely to select actors with multiple domain-related cues as more 
competent than actors with a single domain-related (p < .0001) or multiple neutral cues (p < 
.0001). 
 
Figure 4. Probability of selecting an actor as more (a) approachable or (b) competent as a 
function of cue type (domain vs. neutral) and number (one vs. four cues). 
Overall, the results from our impression formation measure reveals impressions 
consistent with mere exposure and spontaneous domain inferences. The effects are very small, 
which was to be expected, because we used a conservative measure. Dichotomous choice allows 
for very little variance. Furthermore, we had randomized highly influential factors, such as faces, 
and position (left versus right). 
Exploratory analyses. While participants browsed the posts, they saw a 'Like' button on 
each post and were able to click it if they considered the post interesting. We also recorded the 
time they spent browsing and asked them for their own domains of interest. In our sample, the 
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three were not substantially correlated (rs < .12).We examined how these factors relate to 
participants‟ domain inferences, using the domain identification measure. To get a more 
complete picture, we plotted the effects separately for the number of cues factor, which we had 
previously found to influence domain inferences. The experiment was not specifically designed 
to test the effects of these factors, which is why we report no inferential statistics and only 
describe the data (Figure 5).  
The analyses were performed on the level of single trials (n = 4304). Proportion of 
correct instances of domain identification were computed separately for: trials in which there 
was a match between an actor‟s implied domain and the observers‟ self-reported interests and 
trials in which there was no match (Figure 5a); trials where observers had „Liked‟ one of actors‟ 
posts and trials in which they did not (Figure 5b); trials from observers whose browsing time was 
below the median and trials from observers‟ whose time was over the median (Figure5c). 
 Overall, all factors increased the participants' likelihood to spontaneously infer actors' 
domains of interest while browsing. Again, inferences for frequently seen actors (multiple cues) 
were more pronounced and that was especially the case when participants saw actors whose 
domains of expertise matched their own interest, whose posts they liked, and when they spent 
longer time browsing. Our previous analyses revealed that domain inferences were stronger 
when participants saw multiple domain-implying cues. An interesting insight from the 
exploratory analyses is that if an actor's domain matched participants own interests or if 
participants browsed longer, they were more likely to infer actors' expertise even from single 
cues. 
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Figure 5. Exploratory analyses on domain recognition as a function of number of cues and (a) 
matching domain, (b) liking of posts, and (c) browsing time. 
General Discussion 
We began by asking whether and how people manage to keep up with their large but 
increasingly complex networks. Our findings suggest that amid the all too frequent activity of 
browsing social media posts, people spontaneously, without deliberate effort or intention, extract 
information about who knows what. Brief glances at posts such "Front-end developer aka 
JavaScript wizard, hire me!" were sufficient for participants to infer the implied domain 
("programming") and associate it with the person who posted the update. We used an indirect 
measure, which was based on false recognitions (i.e., mistakes), thus ruling out the possibility 
that the effect was due to memorizing the materials. The conditions under which we observed the 
effect closely resembled casual social media browsing. This leads us to expect that processes of 
spontaneously domain recognition occur in everyday life. 
Contemporary information technologies and the unprecedentedly large networks they 
help us build and maintain make the promise of "social supernets" (Donath, 2007), but we have 
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little understanding of how their potential is realized and how it can be enhanced. Ambient 
awareness -- the idea that people process and make sense of the overwhelming influx of social 
information efficiently -- has so far received limited support. By showing that the spontaneous 
trait inference effect extends to domains of expertise in a social-media environment, we provide 
a foundation for explicating the construct and its implications for online social networks. 
Spontaneous trait inference is an astounding social process, with broad implications for 
human social cognition. The theoretical antecedents of the phenomenon are still actively debated 
(Moskowitz & Olcaysoy Okten, 2016). Our finding that people infer domains of expertise from 
short descriptions of behavior as readily and efficiently as they infer traits and values, adds to the 
body of work on spontaneous inferences (Uleman et al., 2008) and builds towards its conceptual 
understanding. 
Our current conceptualization of expertise was in terms of domains rather than degree of 
competence. This conceptualization is close to the notion of knowing who knows what in order 
to find potential sources of information or referrals, and therefore of primary interest to us. 
Competence is critical for particular aspects of the information exchange process (e.g., judging 
the credibility of received information) and for other tasks such as expert selection. It demands 
further investigation. Future research could consider the digital footprints of high and low 
competence (e.g., linguistic markers, endorsements) and whether people can reliably identify 
them, either spontaneously or deliberately. 
We demonstrated the mechanism through which social media users can develop expertise 
awareness. The extent to which they actually do so, would depend on the content to which they 
are exposed. Our experiments featured plausible social-media-like domain cues, but we do not 
know how common it is for people to post such information. Automated analyses, which identify 
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domain-relevant content on a large scale, would be an interesting means of exploring this 
question. Another direction for further research would be to examine cues of different warranting 
value (informativeness, credibility) and how they affect judgments. 
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Levordashka, A. & Utz, S. (2017, May). The Signal in the Noise: Browsing Social Media Augments Users’
Awareness of Who Knows What. Poster presented at the 29th Annual Convention of APS, Boston, USA.
Levordashka, A. & Lückmann, J. (2016, September). Ostracism Online paradigm revisited: Extended
features and their implications for future research. In Schade, H. M. (Chair), Social Exclusion (Part II):
Paradigms and Consequences. Symposium conducted at the 50th conference of the German Psychological
Society (DGPs), Leipzig, Germany.
Levordashka, A., Utz, S. & Lin, R. (2016, June). I read your updates, I read you: Spontaneous trait
inferences on social media. Paper presented at the 66th Annual ICA Conference, Fukuoka, Japan
Levordashka, A., Muscanell, N. & Utz, S. (2016, February). Snap judgments on social media: What we
infer from 140 characters or less. Poster presented at the Annual Convention of the Society for Personality and
Social Psychology (SPSP), San Diego, CA.
Levordashka, A. & Utz, S. (2015, September). Spontaneous trait inferences on social media. Talk at the 9th
Conference of the Media Psychology Division, Tübingen, Germany.
Levordashka, A. (2015, July). Ambient awareness: Can browsing provide awareness of online networks.
Poster presented at Living with Media International Summer School, Cologne, Germany.
Levordashka, A. Lin, R., & Utz, S. (2015, May). Ambient awareness: Interpersonal knowledge in social
media. Paper presented at the 65th Annual ICA Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Levordashka, A. & Wolf, W. (2015, July). Ostracism online: A social media ostracism paradigm. Poster
presented at 17th General Meeting of EASP, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
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Practical Courses & Workshops
Introduction to Data Science with Python. GESIS Methods Seminar. Cologne, July 2017.
Crowdsourcing Research: Transcending Disciplinary Boundaries. Dagstuhl meeting. August 2016.
EASP Summer School in Social Psychology. Exeter, August 2016.
International Summer School Living With Media. Cologne, August 2015.
Awards & Scholarships
Top student paper of the Communication & Technology division of ICA. Fukuoka, June 2016.
Top poster award, International Summer School Living with Media, Cologne, July 2015.
VU Fellowship Programme Scholarship (VUFP), VU University. Academic year 2012/2013.
William James Scholarship by William James Graduate School, VU University. Academic year 2011/2012.
Computer Skills
Research. R, SPSS, PsychoPy, Eprime, SuperLab, Authorware, CMA, Qualtrics.
Programming (basic skills). JavaScript, HTML/CSS, JSON, Twitter API, R Shiny.
Graphics & desktop publishing. Adobe CS (Photoshop, Illustrator, InDesign), Corel DRAW.
Office & typesetting. MS Office (Word, Powerpoint, Excel), Open Office, LaTeX.
